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A THEORY OF SOCIAL FACTS 
SUMMARY 
In the most genera1 sense this thesis is about the £orma1 
structure 0£ the Geisteswissenscha£ten. It is a basic ana1ysis 
0£ the structure 0£ socia1 rea1ity that under1ies a11 the 
specia1 socia1 sciences. Socia1 £acts have a basic onto1ogica1 
and 1ogica1 structure that I be1ieve can be disp1ayed. By 
disp1aying this structure I show how we can trans£orm 
inadequate prehensions 0£ socia1 £acts into a more comp1ete or 
per£ect grasp 0£ the concept. The theory 0£ socia1 £acts I 
present is paradigmatica11y Hege1ian. My ana1ysis shows that 
it has practica1 app1ications. I app1y the theory to the 
specia1 science 0£ 1ega1 anthropo1ogy in order to show that and 
how it can be used to c1ari£y methodo1ogica1 prob1ems in one 
0£ the socia1 sciences. 
KEYWORDS: Kant, Beqe1, Idea1ism, Psycho1oqy, Socio1oqy, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF SOCIAL 
FACTS 
It frequently happens that in our experience we are presented 
with an "incomplete" phenomenon. It might be a strange 
situation or an unidentified object, but whatever it may be 
objectively, we have an incomplete grasp of it. Sometimes it 
is an argument or an idea that we grasp inadequately. Consider 
the concept of a social fact. In spite of a small but rapidly 
growing literature the idea remains shrouded in mystery and 
incomprehension. 
I will use the term "prehension" (following Tragresser, 1976) 
to indicate the existence of an imperfect, inadequate or 
incomplete grasp of an idea. In most instances of incomplete 
concept grasp we find leitfaden, hints of paths which if 
carefully followed out will lead to a more perfect grasp of the 
idea or phenomenon in question. My main aim .is to trace out 
leitfaden between the concept of a social fact and rel.ated 
conceptual structures that can be used to illuminate it. I 
argue that the concept of a social fact is just one concept in 
an array of concepts which, when taken together as a unity, is 
the master concept of the Geisteswissenschaften - Geist. 
My method of procedure is to call attention to and discuss (in 
Chapter Two) certain basic but neglected and/or obscured 
features of Hegel's idealism. I treat these features as 
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paradigma tically sociological, and use them as a base-line with 
which to chart Hegel's criticism of, and against which to 
measure, Kant's first Critique. Since this is arguably the 
most important chapter of the book, it is broken into three 
sections. Section One introduces Hegel's criticism of Kant's 
idealism: in contrast to his own objective idealism, 
transcendental idealism is individualist and subjective. This 
criticism is elaborated in Section Two, issuing in the quasi-
Wittgensteinian indictment that Kant cannot account for the 
possibility of language and human thought. Section Three 
argues that Hegel's criticism that mind is social and that 
objectivity cannot be understood in isolation from symbolic 
interaction amounts to a sociological critique of Kant. Out of 
this sociological critique comes "sociological idealism". This 
Hegelian model allows us to locate the concept of a social fact 
in an array of concepts that, when considered as a unity, is 
the master concept of the social sciences. 
The model of sociological idealism that :I develop, and call 
"Hegelian", consists of a number of clearly identifiable 
features. My aim is to relate these features to the concept 
of social and institutional facts. The array of ideas that are 
encompassed by, and which as a unity constitute, the master 
concept, are listed in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
1) a sui generis "synthesis" of symbolic 
2) 
Geist 3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
interaction, 
a doctrine of "internal relations", 
a "circuit of self and other", 
an "identity" of social concept and object, 
"participant-observor" knowledge, 
"collective ideas", and 
social and institutional facts. 
By fixing social and institutional facts as nodal points in 
this array of concepts or features, my aim is to trace out 
leitfaden or "paths" that exist between them. 
In order to be as contemporary as possible I give flesh to the 
ske1eton of sociological idea1iam by presenting an analysis (in 
Chapter Three) of John R. Searle's The Construction of Social 
Reality (1995), which is one of the most recent attempts in the 
philosophical literature to come to terms with the concept of 
a social fact. Searle uses the term "social reality" to refer 
to the existence of social and institutional facts. I assess 
Searle's model by using sociological idealism as the rule. 
First, Searle introduces a model of "linguistic idealism" 
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wh i ch, in the recent philosophical literature, can be traced 
back to Anscombe' s (and Wittgenstein's) linguistic idealism. 
There are two components of Searle's linguistic idealism that 
I bring forward. The first is Searle's notion that 
institutional facts are "self-referential". By examining this 
notion we see that he is amplifying and clarifying Hegel's 
concept-object "identity theory". Secondly, Searle's argument 
that institutional facts are language-dependent elucidates the 
"linguistic" character of institutional facts. All 
institutional facts are social facts but not all social facts 
are institutional facts. Some pre-linguistic animals may have 
social facts but they cannot have institutional facts because 
they do not have language. Searle helps us trace out leitfaden 
between social and institutional facts, and between 
institutional facts and language. Searle shows that 
institutional facts must be linguistic constructions, but who 
or what does the constructing? What is left out of Searle's 
model is the idea of a reality constructor or Self. There is 
no conception of the Self in Searle's model of social facts. 
Instead he puts forward an inadequate Hobbesian conception of 
man as machine. The concept of interaction is also 
conspicuously absent from Searle's account of social facts, so 
collective intentionality is not logically possible on his 
account. By giving an account of these phenomena toward the 
end of Chapter Three, and in Chapter Eight, I am able to trace 
out leitfaden between them and the concept of a social fact. 
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:In Chapter Four :I turn to the problem of the "objectivity" of 
collective representations. Searle thinks that collective 
ideas exist "in the head" of this or that individual Be gel 
and Durkheim argued that they subsist independently of any one 
person's thinking them. :In order to clarify the status of 
collective ideas, :I discuss them in terms that will be familiar 
to contemporary analytical philosophers. This chapter begins 
a long and twisting account (which extends into Chapter Seven) 
of B.L.A. Bart's analysis of social rules. Social rules are 
taken as paradigms of social facts. :I maintain that Bart's 
conceptual framework presents us with a structure that allows 
us to elucidate Durkheim's conception of social facts (which 
:I see as broadly Hegelian). :It also allows us to understand 
and def end Durkheim's Hegelian claim that collective 
representations exist "independently of" and "external to" 
individual people who think in terms of them. 
:In Chapter Five :I formalize Bart's model. :I contrast Bart's 
"dual" model of rules with Wittgenstein's monistic conception 
of social practices, and argue that Wittgenstein's conception 
is insufficient to account for the possibility of social and 
institutional facts. What is missing from Wittgenstein's model 
is the "internal" aspect of social facts. But there is also 
something missing from Bart's model, namely Hegel's conception 
of internal relations. Most of this chapter is taken up with 
clarifying the "internal" and "external" dimensions of social 
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f acts and with tracing out leitfaden between them. 
Chapter Six turns to one of the most vexed features of social 
facts, their existence as abstracta. In order to elucidate 
this characteristic feature of social facts I turn again to 
Durkheim's conception of social facts. I try to give sense to 
the idea that institutional facts are "abstract" in a way that 
does not involve any "bad" metaphysics or ontology. I do this 
by elaborating in some detail Durkheim's conception of social 
facts and by clearing away misunderstandings of his theory that 
have been put up by writers who have given reductionistic 
accounts of social facts. 
Chapter Seven is an application of the social fact model that 
has unfolded from the preceding several chapters. This social 
fact model, which I see as Hegelian, is constructed out of 
basic ideas drawn from Bart and Durkheim. I apply the model 
to one of the most basic specialty sciences of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, legal anthropology. Legal anthropology 
is basic because it is simple, and the questions it is 
concerned with are also basic and simple. If the social fact 
model has any applicability at all - and this must ultimately 
be the test of any model - we should be able to see it here. 
If the model has no applicability, it is nothing but words. 
If customary law, which is the basic subject-matter of legal 
anthropology, is a social fact, my argument is that it must 
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have all of the features I have claimed apply to the concept 
of a social fact, and it must have the same connections to the 
conceptual array of the master concept. In this chapter I show 
how this is so, and I give examples of how the Hegelian model 
of social facts I have developed out of the work of Bart and 
Durkheim can be used to clarify, if not actually resolve, some 
of legal anthropology's central methodological problems. To be 
more specific, I use this model of social facts to clarify and 
"custom" from "customary law" in legal distinguish 
anthropology. This analysis is shown to give us more adequate 
ways of conceptualizing problems of behaviourism, agency and 
rule-scepticism in legal anthropology. 
Chapter Seven might seem like a detour at first, but it is not 
a useless detour, because in applying the social fact model to 
actual problems in legal anthropology I continue to develop and 
refine this model. But in any case, the attempt to show the 
fruitfulness of general theory by applying it to concrete 
problems in the special social sciences can hardly be called 
a waste of time. The application of the social fact model to 
problems in legal anthropology is just a beginning really, a 
kind of "reality check" on the model developed here. All too 
often theoretical sociology seems vague and obscure, having no 
applicability whatever to concrete problems that social 
scientists encounter in their daily practice. I try to avoid 
that impression by showing how general theory can have a 
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b earing on problems of empirical research. In this way I am 
following Merton (1967) . 
The concluding Chapter Eight turns to Margaret Gilbert's (1989) 
conception of "plural subject phenomena". Plural subject 
phenomena and collective intentionality are deeply imbricated 
features of Geist. I sketch out leitfaden between these 
phenomena and the concept of a social fact. Gilbert's 
treatment of these ideas amplify and elucidate the connections 
that need to be drawn. Ber main problem is that, like Searle, 
she has no good account of concept-grasp and social 
interaction. These Kantian and Hegelian problems are left 
unresolved in her treatment of social facts. 
Even though, as I show, Kant's first Critiqy.e is profoundly, 
if not paradiqma tically, a sociological, in the Postscript I 
argue that we have reason to believe that Kant was working out 
a model of social facts in his later writings. I claim that 
he kept the first Cri tiqy.e asociological for planful reasons 
in accordance with the architechtonic of his lifetime project. 
This book can be fairly easily summarized. In the most general 
sense it is about the formal structure of the 
Geisteswissenschaften. This does not mean that it presents a 
taxonomic classification of the special social sciences. It is 
a basic analysis of the structure of social reality that 
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under 1 i es a11 the specia1 socia1 sciences. Socia1 facts have 
a basic onto1ogica1 and 1ogica1 structure that I be1ieve can 
be disp1ayed. By disp1aying this structure we can transform 
inadequate prehensions of socia1 facts into more perfect 
apprehensions of them. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LEAP FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO 
SOCIOLOGY - HEGEL'S BREAK WITH KANT 
Hegel's Critique of Kant's Idealism 
Sometimes it happens that out of the continually coming, 
continually going, tide of books, some single volume fails to 
disappear with its contemporaries, and because of something it 
contains, or something which it is, lives on to other 
generations. The Critique of Pure aeason is such a work. It is, 
in Collingwood' s appropriate words, "like a mountain, whose 
waters irrigate every little garden of thought in the plains 
beneath it" (1995: 24) . Still it has deficiencies. What is 
interesting is that some of these deficiencies could not have 
been known at the time Kant wrote, because sociology had not 
yet been invented. The word did not exist and the conception 
was only a vague idea in the 18th Century. 
18th Century philosophers misrepresented social reality by 
assimilating it to nature and then talking about it as though 
it were merely part of nature. In a bold but essentially 
misguided way Kant attempted to avoid this error with his 
distinction, based on Leibniz, between phenomena and things in 
themselves. Kant thought that what makes nature "nature" is the 
fact of its being phenomena, that is as something looked at 
from "outside". When human action is seen from the outside 
only, it is converted into phenomena. Granted this dichotomy, 
or parallelism, it distorts natural science because it implies 
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that behind the phenomena of nature there is a reality which 
is also spirit, and this is the foundation of the mystical view 
of nature, which instead of treating natural phenomena as 
concrete things deserving of study for their own sake, treat 
them as a kind of "veil" concealing a spiritual reality. As 
against this, Kant's strategy is to treat both the objects of 
the natural and social sciences as spectacle. If history and 
sociology are spectacle then they are phenomena, they are 
nature, because "nature" for Kant is an epistemological term 
which means "things seen as spectacle" - from the outside only 
(Collingwood makes the same point about Kant in Part III of his 
Idea of History (1946)). 
Hegel refused to approach social reality purely by way of 
nature, that is, from the spectator's point of view. In 
addition to seeing Kant's system as hidebound by a natural 
science methodology and an obscure "noumenalism", in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy in the chapter on Kant 
he also described Kant's philosophy as "subjective" (subjectiv) 
and "personal" (pers§nlich) . 1 These features of Kant's system 
according to Hegel cut it off from the possibility of bridging 
the gap between subjectivity and objectivity. 
This problem was solved for Kant, according to certain writers 
who were influenced by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investiga-
tions, by Kant's introduction of "rules" and "rules for the 
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application of rules", which were said to constitute the 
Empirical Schematism and the Categories of the Understanding 
respectively. Walsh(1966: 189ff.) was the first to make this 
claim. 2 He also claimed that rules "by their very nature have 
interpersonal validity" (Walsh: 195) and that Kant's position 
on rules was "identical in all respects with that of 
Wittgenstein" (Walsh: 197). This is controversial in light of 
Schwyzer' s demonstration that Wittgenstein's notion of "public" 
criteria of rule-following is exactly what Kant's theory lacks, 
and needs, and that Kant's notion of rule-following is 
Cartesian, locked into a first-person perspective from which 
there is no escaping (1990: 113-161). Although Kant uses the 
subject as a "ground" of unity in the world, that underlying 
unity is according to Hegel "finite" (endlich) or 
"psychological" (or, in the de-psychologized B-Edition of the 
first Critiqye, "formal" or "empty") because Kant's subject is 
constituted only through its own individual synthesizing 
activities. Hegel regards this as a fundamental mistake. 
Hegel thought that Kant's "empiricism" led him to adopt a 
sophisticated version of the bundle theory of objects, 
according to which the "given" is no more than a swarm of 
particulars, unconnected features of experience which are 
transformed into a unity only through individual synthesis. 
The Kantian model is "individualistic" because the unity of 
things we encounter in experience is "reducible" to the 
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manifold of intuitions out of which they are constructed. Stern 
(1990:200) seems clearly right to think that the key to Hegel's 
criticism of Kant's doctrine is the latter's view that "the 
object as we experience it has its relational unity imposed on 
it by us [individually]". l:n a similar way Guyer (1987: 351) 
writes that, like Hume, "Kant harboured a prejudice against the 
ultimate reality of relations". Hegel was more than a little 
impatient with Kant's "reductionist" and "atomistic" account of 
experience. Kant rejected Hume's empiricist-associationist 
doctrine of an essentially passive human mind, as Rosen (1982) 
makes abundantly clear. l:n place of that doctrine he put his 
own constructivism. While applauding this move, Hegel thinks 
Kant failed to repudiate Hume's other key doctrine the 
doctrine of the essentially unconnected character of 
experience. 
The Kantian model is "individualistic" because the unity of 
things encountered in experience is "reducible" to the manifold 
of intuitions out of which it is synthesized. Hegel's counter 
doctrine is that the structure of the world subsists in an 
intelligible realm. Perception is not just a matter of 
sensation. Here Hegel could agree with Kant. But Hegel differs 
fundamentally in thinking that the nonsensible component of 
perception, which converts it from a sense impression, 
belonging to the inner world, into a perception of a thing or 
event, belongs to an "objective" realm, which he regarded as 
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social. We as individuals "discover" this realm through 
socialization. This involves learning to react to and grasp 
"objective" relations that are "already there" as, in another 
context, Gellner (1959:498) has noted. At times social reality 
may even seem forced on us. In any case, we do not 
unilaterally or individually "create" the world through private 
acts of Kantian synthesis. 
Hegel argues repeatedly that universals and collective 
representations must be considered as subsisting outside of the 
minds of individuals. 
example, can hardly be 
A system of signs, or currency, for 
considered as the product of any one 
individual mind. Or consider reason. It is a feature of 
reason that it cannot be completely developed in the lifetime 
of a single individual. No one, for example, can invent the 
whole of mathematics .or a legal system out of his own head. 3 
By calling Kant's idealism "subjective" Hegel's point was not 
that Kant was a phenomenalist or a Berkeleyian. Some writers, 
like Bird (1987) , have questioned recent phenomenalist readings 
of Kant and have sought to defend Kant from Hegel by finding 
the latter guilty of the same misreading. But Hegel's claim 
that Kant's idealism is subjective is based on another ground 
altogether. Hegel applied this label to describe Kant's 
emphasis on the synthesizing subject to explain the unity and 
structure of individual consciousness. Stern (1990: 107ff .) is 
surely right to say that Hegel's fundamental objection to 
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Kant's idealism is that it is "subjective" in this sense. 
Hegel denies that the unity of consciousness is created by a 
synthesizing subject and then projected against the world like 
a screen. The central role given by Kant to the subjective 
consciousness in imposing structure on the world is what leads 
Hegel to call Kant's idealism a system of "subjective idealism" 
Hegel rejoins that if the world is seen as possessing a pre-
existing structure, the "external world" (a synthesized, social 
world) is freed from having its form imposed on it by an 
individual, subjective mind. :It thus no longer fits the 
Kantian doctrine of synthesis. This is not to say that 
influential, charismatic individuals cannot, through the sheer 
force of their own synthesizing activities (through speeches, 
writings, heroic acts of public leadership, etc.) "change" the 
world. :It means that the world is "out there", pre-existing-
individual apprehensions of it, to be changed, or maintained, 
through social movements or possibly through more organic, less 
visible processes. :In the 1st Critique the structure of the 
world is atomistic and phenomenal and no object has an 
irreducible unity or structure. Hegel's antithesis is that the 
world possesses a unity that is free of any synthesis on the 
part of any QD.§t individual Kantian subject. 4 
decisive break with Kant. 
This is a 
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Hegel's Doctrine of Internal Relations 
It is principally in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and, 
to a less appreciated extent, in his two Logics, that Hegel 
develops his social theory of consciousness, otherwise known as 
"objective idealism". By briefly considering this doctrine we 
can gain a more rounded view of Kant's system, as Hegel sees 
it. Or in other words, by contrasting Kant's "subjective" 
idealism with Hegel's "objective" counterpart we can take the 
measure of the 1st Critique from Hegel's sociological 
perspective. Hegel claims more than once that we are driven 
to "objective" idealism and a "realist" account of universals 
(i.e. concepts) when we seek to explain the possibility of the 
development of consciousness from its lowest levels of 
awareness to "objective" knowledge. We do this, he thinks, by 
postulating the existence of an "intelligible realm" which 
allows us to escape from the fragmented and confused world of 
immediate sensory experience. 5 It is Hegel's considered view 
that this intelligible world is not merely an abstract social 
structure but a process of interaction whereby concrete actions 
of different individuals merge and form sequences. These 
sequences are "logical" sequences behind which we can find 
"logical" relations. On Hegel's account there is an internal 
rel a ti on between logical sequence and temporal sequence, and 
the sequence by which one event leads to another in time is in 
some way the same as the "necessary" sequence by which one 
thing leads to another in a non-temporal logical series. But 
-17-
for the Kantian observor, there can be no "necessary" 
connections at all, no relations, only Bumean conjunctions that 
can hardly be called "sequences" at all. 
It is basic sociology6 that sequences of behaviour that are 
manifestations of internal or "social" relations become 
"visible" only through participant observation, and may remain 
unnoticed or hidden when viewed purely from the spectator's 
observational point of view. This is not to say that 
everything in a practice or an institution will always be 
transparent to everyone. Often what a participant "knows" will 
come down to simple know-how that may just be "habits" (as 
Wittgenstein noted) that enable people to carry on with 
confidence (as people hand.le the grammatica.l intricacies of 
their native language before they are exposed to grammatical 
theory). But behind these unref1ective habits, in the case of 
speech behaviour, it is the storehouse of social forms that we 
call langua (and not just parole) that makes communication 
possible. These social forms are the ground of all social life 
and their interrelations are the foundation of all 
connectedness and intelligibility in the social field. 
So much for generalities. Consider the following example: it 
is a logical consequence of being tagged "out" in American 
baseball that you must leave the playing field. The "must" in 
"you must leave the field" demanded by the referee is not just 
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a moral or a social injunction .internal to the game. It is a 
logical consequence of being tagged with the ball when the 
player is off-base. If this is denied, and if it is maintained 
that temporal sequence and logical implication have nothing to 
do with each other, it becomes impossible to say about any 
event, "given A, B must have happened". As we watch the game 
we can see the logic of the actions unfolding from within the 
stream of collective ideas that makes it possible. These 
"ideal constructions" in terms of which we think have an 
outward manifestation. Still it can be difficult for the 
culturally ignorant (and impossible for the unsocialized 
solitary) to separate the sequences that are the outward 
manifestations of them from mere chance conjunctions or 
imagined and projected patterns of behaviour. The reason is 
not difficult to fathom. The difference between chance 
conjunctions and rule-governed (or social) sequences is that 
the latter have something abstract standing "behind" them as 
it were, which gives sense to them by relating them in 
logically or conceptually necessary ways that participants 
recognize and know. 7 This is something the later Wittgenstein 
could never countenance and, in this sense, he was following 
Kant, knowingly or unknowingly. 
When Hegel said that history, by which he meant the Herculean 
aspect of society, consists of empirical events that are the 
outward expression of thought he meant collective thoughts, and 
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these collective thoughts behind the outward events he thought 
of as a chain of logically connected concepts. Critics who 
blame Hegel for thinking that there are "necessary" connections 
in history (and in social action) either misunderstand him or 
else they are thinking only in terms of Kantian phenomena. 
Social reality, according to Hegel, has an "inside" (not to be 
confounded with the psychological) in addition to an outside 
and these are bound together by logical or "conceptual" 
relations. This sociological insight, which Kant never really 
developed, and may not have seen, was probed by Wittgenstein 
and Durkheim (Bloor, 1983; Hund, 1982, 1989) In essence the 
former's treatment of the "publicity", and thereby the 
possibility, of meaning and knowledge comes to this: if 
language is to exist (a) there must be behavioural correlates 
of meaning, and (b) these must be sufficient to enable those 
hearing a speaker to grasp the meaning in question. These are 
logical conditions of speech. Durkheim regarded speech as the 
sui generis "synthesis" that makes social reality "possible". 
Kant's model does not allow for this possibility. The 
importance of this can hardly be overestimated. 
The Ist Critique does not allow for the possibility of human 
thought, speech or action, or interaction of any kind. In 
fact, Kant's model of thinking does not go beyond the 
possibility of the use of empirical concepts without language 
(cf. Waxman, 1995). The Empirical Schematism section of Kant's 
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Analytic (the first part of the Ist Critique) is an attempt to 
explain how such concepts of objects are possible. But it is 
insufficient to account for the possibility of lanquaqe and 
human thouqh t. The model of thinkinq in the Ist Critiqpe is 
probably best suited for understandinq the proto-thinkinq of 
prelinquistic animals, and that aspect of human thinkinq which, 
in infants, precedes the use of lanquaqe. 8 
When Beqel repudiated the Kantian bifurcation of phenomena and 
thinqs in themselves he put into practice his own warninq that 
we must not suppose ideas to exist only in the minds of 
concrete individuals. If collective representations were not 
"independent" of individual people's thinkinq them, there would 
not be any "people" at all, because there would be no social 
reality, no society, and thus no socially constituted selves. 
Nor would there be "nature", in any strict natural science 
sense, because that complex idea is the loqical framework 
within which alone a world of natural science is possible. The 
social patterns and sequences that we "see" are not the result 
of any Kantian imposition of forms throuqh individual 
synthesis. They are "manifestations" of social-coqnitive 
structures that we discover throuqh participant-observation. 
If Kant had qrasped his own idea firmly Beqel thinks he would 
have seen that phenomena and thinqs in themselves are but two 
aspects of a social whole. 9 And he would also have seen that 
in order to appreciate the difference between brute and social 
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facts we must approach this distinction from the internal, 
participatory side, and not merely as an external observer. 
Geist as socialized Understanding - Sociological Idealism 
Perhaps one of Hegel's most valuable contributions to 
philosophy is his attempt to see historical trends and 
developments in a system of philosophy that even its originator 
did not, and perhaps could not, have seen, and to find advances 
in that philosophy that had not previously been seen as 
advances. What we must do for Hegel is to read his work not 
necessarily as he insists we read it, but as he himself reads 
the work of his predecessors. 10 
Hegel nowhere indicates that Geist is introduced to solve any 
problem in the Critique of Pure R9as9n. But if we read Hegel's 
critique of the Ist Critique as a sociological critique, we can 
ask ourselves what problems he was attempting to solve with its 
introduction. And in particular we can ask why the special 
concept of objective mind was introduced at all. 
The basic presupposition of Pippin's Continuity Thesis 11 is 
that the differences between Kant's and Hegel's idealism are 
peripheral and non-paradigmatic. But Hegel's Geist is no 
"successor" to Kant's transcendental subject; it is a complete 
sociological overhaul of the conception. In order to understand 
this we must consider that Kant regarded the "I think,; as the 
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first principle of philosophical methodology and as the 
"highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge". 12 
The conception of "objective" mind is a direct confrontation 
with this principle. Hegel thought that traditional 
epistemology, which Kant inherited from his predecessors and 
deployed in the Ist Critique, studies knowledge or thought in 
a subjective sense, in terms of "I know" or "I think". Such an 
epistemology requires that every philosophical proposition, 
indeed all knowledge, must be justified from a first person 
standpoint. 
proposition 
According to this doctrine, or methodology, every 
and all knowledge depends upon my individual 
mind for its justification, and any other mind can only be a 
philosophical problem. According to this way of thinking, my 
mind is not one among others, and I am not one person among 
others. 13 
Hegel thought all of this was mistaken. Be perceived two 
fundamental mistakes with Kant's treatment of the self. Both 
of these, he thought, followed from Kant's strict adherence in 
the Ist Critique to the spectator methodology of the natural 
sciences. This in turn is linked to his empiricism. Because 
Kant (like Hume) allegedly makes the assumption that "real" 
means "observable in principle", he passes from "the self is 
not observable" to "there is no self". Or, according to Priest 
(1987: 36) , he equivocates between this and "the subject is not 
real". In either case he is led to the idea that the self is 
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an empty or formal principle. It is uncontroversial that Kant 
attaches no "ontological" weight to the subject. We know that 
he laid down a distinction between the transcendental "I think" 
and the empirical self, but he had little to say about the 
latter, and he certainly never regarded it as social. Be did 
argue, however, that any inference from the "I think" to the 
actual existence of a subject is the result of an invalid 
syllogism, or paralogism, that wrongly moves from the formal 
conditions of consciousness to a conclusion about a 
supersensible entity. The subject is not an object of 
experience. It is unknownable because it corresponds to no 
sensible intuition. The unity of apperception is nothing but 
a formal principle of transcendental idealism. 
Hegel regarded Jtant' a methodology as to blame for his badl.y 
formulated view that the subject cannot be observed or known. 
We do not first obtain knowledge of the self by observing it 
from outside as phenomena. We first discover it by participat-
ing with other selves in society. Hegel's introduction of 
participant observer knowledge is in one stroke also an 
introduction to his social psychology - his "sociological" way 
of seeing. Consciousness of self according to Hegel begins to 
develop as we learn to see ourselves through the eyes or, less 
metaphorically, the mirror-like responses of others. This is 
a reflective process the latter stages of which depend upon the 
use of language and speech. Hegel repudiates Kant's "pure" 
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self, existing in the mind prior to any experience. He is 
nothing if not emphatic. The social self is the only kind of 
self there is . The social self, or mind, forms a kind of 
circuit which serves to connect it to the world by fusing its 
actions with those of other social minds. 14 Not only that, but 
the self is "continuous" in a way that Kant never considered -
it is fused with the social world. When we think, as Kant was 
only too keenly aware, we try to discover connections, as 
distinct from mere conjunctions. We want to be able to say 
that A must go with B, not merely that A and B are as a matter 
of fact always found together. The self, though it appears 
inwardly as private and subjective, is under another aspect a 
"moment" in the objective reality of Geist. Hegel thinks this 
is evident once we reflect on the requirements of knowledge. 
Not only does knowled9e require that experience be related, it 
also requires an order of "objective" relations subsisting 
independently of the subject. The transcendental subject does 
not first exist as a unity of apperception in some state of 
splendid isolation. Without the circuit of self and other 
there would be no unity of .Any, kind. 15 The relation of 
individual mind to objective mind can be represented by drawing 
a circle with a crooked line from top to bottom. The line 
frames the profile of two faces "interfacing", and the circle 
represents the process Hegel calls Geist. Objective mind will 
usually consist of, in fact it will almost always involve, a 
whole community of selves interacting. On the greatest scale 
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"national experience" brings multitudes of individuals 
together "as one people" - a Volksgeist - so that people can 
say "I am because we are". There is nothing in the Critique 
of Pure Reason that corresponds to any of this. 
Having thus seen that mind is, or can be, "social" (this is 
not to deny the "spontaneous" biological aspect of 
consciousness) we must now ask what role it plays in any 
constructionist account of knowledge. The whole thrust of 
Kant's Copernican Revolution was towards its conclusion that 
things and facts about them are constructions which are 
dependent for their existence on the operations of mind. But 
what level of "mind" does the Critigµe of Pure Reason belong 
to? Empiricists have always tended to classify philosophical 
theories by their attitude to the perception of mater~al 
objects. For them, as Passmore (1957, chapters 8-10) displays, 
"realism" is the view that things exist even when no one is 
perceiving them. Idealism is the view that they exist Qilil 
when someone is perceiving them. When we reflect on empiricist 
theories of knowledge we see that things are knowable in terms 
of individual experience only. This was Kant's way of treating 
perception and knowledge in the Ist Critique. But Hegel had 
no particular, or essential, interest in the theory of 
perception, and would have strongly objected to having his 
idealism classed with Kant's or Berkeley's. The theme of 
Hegel's "sociological" idealism is that to be "real" is to be 
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part of a system, an intelligible whole of some kind. 
Something is "real" insofar as it collectively exists as a 
communal way of seeing. Being able to talk about it is a 
necessary condition of its "reality". To encounter something 
that has not been named is to encounter something that has no 
status as a thing. 
ephemera. 
It is no better than private and imaginary 
Descartes, sitting in front of his fireplace, could ask himself 
whether, in addition to his own idea of a fire there is also 
a real fire. But when we consider a collective reality like 
language a parallel question can never arise. The distinction 
between the collective ~ of a social reality and the reality 
its elf has no purchase. The German language for exampl.e is 
exactly what the people who use it think it is. This ia, 
basical.l.y, just a restatement of Hegel's vaunted and much 
misunderstood concept-object "identity theory". 
A collective idea and its social object are one and the same. 
Sociol.ogical knowledge is a kind of knowl.edge in which 
questions about col.lective ideas and questions about social 
facts or realities are not distinguishable, or better, they are 
but two sides of a structure which are separable onl.y by 
abstraction. We can sum this up with Artistotelian simplicity 
by paraphrasing Berkeley's dictum to read "to be is to be 
collectively perceived to be". A "king" or a "queen" for 
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example is such because the incumbent of that status is 
collectively defined and treated that way. A coin or a Dollar 
bill (that is, a piece of metal or a piece of paper with grey 
and green ink on it) is money because it is collectively 
defined and treated as "money". The legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of a government is constituted by collective perceptions of 
these phenomena. Anscombe (1976) called this "linguistic 
idealism". Searle has defended a similar theory in his 
Construction of Social Reality (1995: 31-78) . This doctrine 
has a long history. In fact it was none other than Durkheim 
who wrote that "there is one division of nature where the 
formula of idealism is applicable almost to the letter - this 
is the social kingdom. 
is also the reality" 
Here more than anywhere else the idea 
(1915: 228) . Social reality is the 
projection and reception of cognitions through which it is 
cognised (insofar as these cognitions are collective 
cognitions) . It is the very intellectual activity that 
generates the reality. The traditional realism/idealism 
controversy takes a "new form" when social reality is 
substituted for physical reality, (cf. Collin, 1997: xi) 
we need to do is draw these strands together. 
What 
In order to understand Hegel's sociological idealism we need 
to see that "objects" are knowable only as part of a system 
which we have collectively created for rational purposes. The 
empiricist's "realism" offers us a picture of reality 
considered 
individual. 
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as an "external world" which confronts an 
But social experience is not a bare perception of 
a given world. It is a construction, a collective mode of 
apprehension made tangible in abstract structure and saved from 
arbitrary subjectivity by its rationality and orderliness. 
Buman experience exibits a movement away from concrete 
particularity towards an ideal, abstract system in which 
society is reflected and expressed. The central clue to the 
understanding of human knowledge is language, and language too 
develops away from the sensuous and direct towards the abstract 
and symbolic. The least we can experience, according to Hegel, 
is a matrix of relations which conditions the ways we see and 
think. To talk is to use pre-existing judgements as 
foundations for descriptions and performances. Empiricism is 
rejected on the ground that for it immediate experience is 
composed of sequences of sensations only. Empiricism 
falsifies, by intellectualizing, the character of our lived 
experience. Hegel takes the experience of the fully socialized 
person, or self, as the starting point of his idealism, not the 
sensuous manifold of an asocial, solitary being. This 
constitutes a decisive break with Kant's idealism. 
The Ist Critiqµe sought to establish, for once and for all, 
that relations are the work of the mind. Kant rightly saw 
this as a movement away from realism towards an idealism of 
some kind. Where Hegel parts company with Kant is in his 
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denial that all relations are individually and unilaterally 
imposed on a manifold which in itself contains no objects of 
experience, or relations of any kind. If you remove these 
relations, he thought, you also remove objects of experience, 
you take away the intelligible world, which is really no more 
than a collective world. If this happens, the possibility of 
an essentially objective world confronting an inquirer is lost, 
and what is left is a Pirandellian world where "it is so if 
~ think so". Such a world is a world in which the 
possibility of truth is finished and there is no reality apart 
from individual perceptions of it. 
The distinction between "subjective" and "objective" is vital 
for any kind of inquiry, but it seems to vanish if the world 
is always of the individual mind's making. Hegel's attempt to 
overcome this problem is paradigmatically sociological. It has 
no counterpart in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant's solution 
to the problem of objectivity there is a generalized version 
of the problem of an "objective" causal order. Be makes it 
clear in the 2nd Edition version of the 2nd Analogy (B 234-236) 
that the problem of objectivity with respect to the temporal 
order is to explain how it is possible, by means of phenomena 
alone (which are all that is given) , to represent an 
"objective" order that cannot be identified merely with the 
order of phenomena themselves. Under the category of causality 
all appearances necessarily stand in relations of cause and 
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effect. This has the consequence that all appearances are 
"ordered in time", and so gives "objective" validity within the 
field of appearances to succession (as one of the modes of 
time) . Waxman (1995) argues that this pattern is repeated for 
all of the categories and thus inscribes an entire system of 
logical functions "on" appearances. This shows how, he thinks, 
Kantian experience acquires "objective" validity. Kant's 
solution to the problem of objectivity is as solitary as it is 
asociological. 
Hegel sees no hope at all for Kant's treatment of objectivity. 
He thinks that the distinction between what is constituted by 
society and what is the product, only, of an imperfect 
individual mind accounts for our experience of objectivity, and 
for the common sense distinction between what is real and what 
is not, without departing from the idealist principle that 
everything in experience is, essentially, a product of mind. 
The reason things seem to us, as individuals, as being 
objective is that they are "independent" of the projections and 
impositions of our own individual, finite mind. And unless we 
are completely insane this is something that we all recognize 
and know. 
world. 
We as individual.s do not unilateral.l.y create the 
We can sum up these ideas, not necessaril.y in the order I have 
presented them, l.ike this: 
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Table 1 - Two Paradigms of Philosophy 
Sociological 
Hegel's Idealism 
sui generis "synthesis" of 
symbolic interaction 
doctrine of internal 
relations 
circuit of self and other -
Geist 
identity theory: 
lan9ua9e/world isomorphism 
phenomena/appearances tied 
to intelli9ible world 
throu9h internal relations 
intelligible world knowable 
through participant 
observation 
collective ideas 
(in addition to pure and 
empirical concepts) 
social/institutional facts 
Asociological 
Kant's Critige of Pure Reason 
individual synthesis only 
relations imposed by 
individuals on "given" 
self is empty or formal 
regulative principle only; 
self is isolated, asocial 
no language or speech; no 
speech acts or perf ormatives 
unbridgable gulf between 
phenomena and noumena 
intelligible world unknowable 
- spectator theory of 
observation 
pure and empirical concepts 
only 
brute facts only 
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It is evident that many distinctions and qualifications would 
be needed to make this table stand up to close inspection. 
But if it is anywhere near right it should be apparent that 
Kant's first Critique is profoundly, if not paradigmatically, 
asociological. 16 But for whom exactly is this supposed to be 
news? Kant's asociologism was well known to Simmel and 
Durkheim, and Dilthey aimed to (but never did) write a Critique 
of Historical Reason that would've done for the social sciences 
what the Ist Critique had done for the natural sciences. It 
is contemporary Kant-Hegel scholarship (and much of psychology 
too) that has forgotten what the classical sociologists knew 
well about the Ist Critique. These scholars have yet to be 
shown that Kant's model is insufficient to account for human, 
social thought, and they continue to miss out on the 
sociological features of Hegel's idealism, and his critique of 
Kant. Findlay was closer to the truth than he knew when he 
wrote that Hegel had invented an idealism "in a thoroughly new 
sense of the word" (1958: 1), but even Findlay did not consider 
how Hegel sought to incorporate a wide variety of sociological 
features into his idealism. 17 
What makes Hegel's critique of Kant's idealism important is 
that modern philosophy (including analytical Kant-Hegel 
scholarship) is dominated by the same sort of empiricist 
epistemology that Hegel alleges we find in Kant. When I read 
the works of contemporary and recent analytical philosophers, 
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admiring them deeply and learning from them more than I can 
hope to acknowledge, I find myself constantly struck by the 
thought that their accounts of knowledge not only debase the 
existence of social reality, but are actually inconsistent with 
there being any such thing. The nucleus of Hegel's idealism 
is the idea that self and society are synthetic unities that 
cannot be reduced to collections of self-subsistent phenomena 
out of which they are constructed. 
mistake to treat these social unities 
Hegel regards it as a 
as if they were spun 
by private synthesizing individuals out of discrete phenomena 
in this solitary Kantian way. Hegel's break with Kant is abrupt 
and arguably paradiqma tic, and seems to be analogous to the 
leap from individual psychology to sociology. 
Notes 
l It would be silly to attempt any sort of 
philological-exegetical analysis in an interpretive chapter of 
this nature. The section on Kant referred to in the text is 
only one of several discussions of Kant's theoretical 
philosophy in Hegel's corpus. Pippin (1989b) counts at least 
six: (i) the section on Kantian philosophy in the 1802 Belief 
and Knowlege, (ii) a series of remarks in the Science of Logic 
(1812-1816), (iii) "The Notion in General" in the Logic, (iv) 
the section titled "The Critical Philosophy" in the Encyclopedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences, (v) paragraphs 413-424 in the 
same work, and (vi) the section on Kant mentioned above. 
2 Bennett (1966: 54 ff.) also makes this sort of claim. Be says 
that, for Wittgenstein, "conceptual" means "rule-governed" and 
avers that Kant's "working use" of "concept" is "thoroughly 
3 
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Wittgensteinian". Wolff (1963, pp. 129 ff.) was another 1960s 
commentator who used Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following 
to explain Kantian "mental processes". Wolff was so impressed 
with his own Wittgensteinian rule-following interpretation of 
Kant that he declared the one-over-many problem of concept-grasp 
finally resolved. 
These are Collingwood's examples. The fullest treatment of 
how, on Hegel's account, concepts can be said to be "outside" 
of the minds of concrete individuals is in Westphal's treatment 
(1989) of Hegel's conceptual or Platonic realism. According to 
Westphal, to put it succinctly, Hegel's talk of the "autonomy 
of thought" includes thought's automony from human individual 
thinking. Pippin (1989), on the other hand, gives a 
psychologistic reading of Hegel by assimilating the autonomy of 
thought to the autonomous thinking of individual human beings. 
Conceptual realism makes sense when it is construed as a 
sociological doctrine, the idea being that concepts exist in 
society and not merely "in" the individual. Also see Wisdom 
(1993) , Pinkard (1994) and Hundert (1989) . 
4 Brook, (1994) claims that Kant's theory of mind needs "another 
kind of synthesis", and says this is the "key" (pp. 32-33) to 
the completion of Kant's theory, but there is no indication that 
he has considered the sociological critique of Kantian 
(individual) synthesis. 
5 Bradley (1928: 69) puts it that "we escape from ideas and from 
universals by reference to the real, which appears in 
perception". Hegel claims that we escape from the immediacy of 
perception by entering the world of concepts and ideas. 
Durkheim. saw it both ways: "simply because he is social, man 
is therefore double ... for there really are two sources of life 
that are different and virtually antagonistic in which we 
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participate simultaneously" (Durkheim, 1984) . 
6 Too basic to require comment. For a refresher course consult 
Cicourel's Cognitive Sociology (1974), Winch's Idea of a Social 
Science (1959), or Schutz's Collected Works (esp. 1962). 
7 The problem of how we grasp these social sequences as 
"unities" is related to what Smith (1989, pp. 163, 169) calls 
the "linkage problem" which is about the relationship between 
social forms and the "patterns of behaviour" whose contents they 
are. I have elsewhere (Hund, 1991, pp. 774-76) tried to sketch 
a framework for discussing the linkage problem in terms of 
Hart's inner/outer conception of a rule. 
8 Some philosophers still recite the old view that what 
distinguishes humans from infra-humans is that the former use 
concepts and tools while the latter do not. Many infra-human 
animals use empirical concepts. What distinguishes us from them 
is that we use language whereas they use concepts without 
language. Their behaviour is prelinguistic and their "thought" 
is proto-thought. For more on this see Searle's The 
Construction of Social Reality (1995, esp. Ch. 3). 
9 Allison (1983: 16) claims that Kant did see the noumena/ 
phenomena connection and that his distinction between phenomena 
and things in themselves merely marks two ways in which they may 
be considered at the "metalevel" of philosophical reflection. 
10 This idea is advanced by R.C. Soloman (1976: 125-49). 
11 By drawing what he thinks are Hegelian conclusions from passages 
in the second half, or "extension", of the B-Deduction and 
elsewhere Pippin (1989a) argues that Hegel's idealism is a 
"completion" of an insight first unearthed but badly expressed 
-36-
by Kant. Westphal (1989) , Wartenberg (1993) , Stern (1990) and 
I argue for a more radical break between Kant and Hegel than 
Pippin will allow . .Ameriks (1991) also disagrees with Pippin's 
"continuity thesis", but for reasons different from those 
advanced here. 
12 B-135 
13 Soloman (1976) sketches these points but does not consider 
how Hegel sought to incorporate a wide variety of sociological 
considerations into his idealism. Although Regel sometimes 
describes Geist as a "divine subject" any student of Durkheim 
will know that this divine subject is just an obscure proto-
sociological allusion to society. 
this. 
Soloman does not consider 
14 For stimulating discussions see Kotarba (1989) . 
15 The standard (whether right or wrong) interpretation of Regel 
is that he thinks that All facts are institutional facts. 
Searle argues that this is a logical impossibility. Be claims 
that "there has to be some physical realization" of 
institutional facts (1995: 56). Money, for example, must come 
in "some physical form" (1995: 35). A socially constructed 
reality presupposes a reality independent of all social 
constructions "because there has to be somethng for the 
construction to be constructed out of" (1995: 190). 
16 My interpretation of Hegel's critique of Kant is shaped by 
ethnomethodological considerations and not by better known 
"political" ideas on Hegel's critique (beginning at least with 
Lukacs) which treat sociology in a more historical - and less 
cognitive and epistemological - way. 
17 In one of Pippin's latest papers which I cannot trace at the 
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moment he dismisses "sociological talk" as "unHegelian". In 
another (1989b) he regards Hegel's concept-object identity 
thesis (the heart of his sociological idealism) as mystified 
. nonsense. By missing out on the sociological dimensions of 
Hegel's idealism Pippin cuts himself off from a fuller reading 
of Hegel. But Pippin is not alone in this. Anglo-American 
Kant-Hegel scholarship is, in general, quite asociological. Or 
to put it differently, it has not yet taken the leap from 
individual psychology to sociology. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SEARLE'S THEORY OF SOCIAL REALITY 
In his treatment of social facts Searle says that "the 
metaphysical complexity of the ontology of the social world 
would've taken Kant's breath away, if he had ever bothered to 
think about such things" (1995: 3) . But Kant did think about 
such things . In a well-known passage in his anthropological 
works Kant discusses an explorer who thinks he has unearthed 
the ruins of an ancient temple. His native guide sees nothing 
but a pile of rubble. The temple is an institutional fact. 
The rubble is its visible manifestation. Kant's question is 
whether there are two different objects here or merely one 
object viewed from two different perspectives. This is 
basically the same problem that bothers Searle. Searle says 
we can look at a coin or a Dollar bill from two perspectives. 
From one perspective - that of the natural sciences - the coin 
or Dollar bill is nothing but a piece of metal or a piece of 
paper with grey and green ink on it. From another perspective 
they are institutional facts. Searle's answer to Kant's 
question, if he had thought about it, wou1d be that 
institutional reality is somehow embodied in nature and goes 
beyond it. Natural science cannot do justice to institutional 
reality because this point of view cannot cope with the 
abstract character of institutional facts and especially with 
the incredibly complex logical relations existing between them. 
This puts paid to behaviourism (and to the natural science 
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methodology of the 1st Critique) because the description of 
merely overt behaviour cannot account for the "invisible 
structure" (1995: 4) of social reality that accounts for the 
possibility of it. 
Searle's claim is that this invisible social structure is 
"self-referential". By this he means that there are portions 
of the real world that exist only because "we believe them to 
exist" (1995: 1) . Social reality is what it is because it is 
perceived as being that way. 
"logically prior" to what it is. 
What it appears to be is 
Money, for example, is self-
referential in this way. "l:n order that the concept of money 
apply to the stuff in my pocket it has to be defined as the 
kind of thing people think of as money" (1995: 32) . 11'he 
attitude people take towards money is "partially constitutive" 
of money. "[B] elief that something is money · is in part the 
belief that it is believed to be money" (1995: 33) . "Money" is 
a self-referential concept or, what amounts to the same thing, 
the institution of money is self-referential. Searle thinks 
this is a remarkable feature of social reality that has no 
analogue in physical reality. 
Readers familiar with Anscombe' s examples of self-reference 
(eg, a king or the legitimacy of a government as being 
"constituted" by collective perceptions of these phenomena) 
will immediately see a link between Searle' s self-reference 
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thesis and linguistic idealism. Searle, however, thinks 
Anscombe's linguistic idealism (and her analysis of brute and 
institutional facts?) is more or less irrelevant to his 
concerns. But this seems wrong. Consider Searle's idealist 
formula for self-reference. He says that for any "observor 
relative" feature of institutional reality: 
Seeming to be F is 
logically prior to being 
F because. . . seeming to 
be F is a necessary 
condition of being F 
(1995: 13) . 
This idealist formula is radically inconsistent with received 
philosophical wisdom, namely that the very nature of knowledge 
unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists 
independently of the knowledge of it. Conventional wisdom says 
that it is simply impossible to think that any reality depends 
on our knowledge of it. The standard objection to idealism is 
that it is unintelligible to suggest that reality is dependent, 
not on the existence of mind, but on being known by mind. And 
yet this is exactly what Searle is saying. 
Searle thinks that self-reference is a puzzle, or a problem he 
can solve. But he doesn't say what the problem is, or even 
why the puzzle is a problem. Searle forces it into the light 
of day without saying what it is. A little thinking about the 
puzzle shows it to be (at bottom) the problem of idealism. 
Searle's "solution" of the problem is to substitute 
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institutional reality for physical reality and to show how 
received philosophical wisdom applies only to physical reality. 
Institutional reality, unlike physical reality, is self-
referential. Self-reference is a problem only if we think that 
all knowledge is knowledge of physical reality. But not all 
knowledge is of this kind. 
reality. 
Some knowledge is of institutional 
Having solved the problem of self-reference in this way, 
Searle's next question is "how is institutional reality 
possible?" Bis answer (which is also part of the solution) is 
that it is made possible by language and is itself language-
dependent. What separates human beings (living in an 
institutional world) from infra-human brutes (living in a world 
of brute facts) is not that the former use tools and concepts 
while the latter do not. Many infra-human animals use tools 
and concepts . What distinguishes us from them is that we have 
language and they don't. Thus, we can have thoughts they are 
incapable of having. For example, the "thought" that certain 
physical movements (X) "count as" (Y) , six points, can only 
exist relative to a linguistic system (context C) for 
representing and counting points. We can think about po in ts 
only if we are in possession of the representational apparatus 
necessary for such a system. If you subtract the symbolic 
devices (the constitutive rules) for representing the points 
"there is nothing else there". The dog can "see" the man 
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cross the line with the ball, and thus, according to Searle, 
can think that thought without language. What the dog cannot 
in addition see or think is that the man has scored a 
touchdown. Prelinguistic animals can have proto-thoughts 
insofar as they can grasp and use simple natural concepts 
having brute facts as their referents. But there can be no 
prelinguistic way to represent the institutional dimension of 
behaviour because there is nothing there prelinguistically that 
could be perceived or otherwise attended to in addition to the 
brute physical dimension. That is why, says Searle, animals 
cannot have marriage, property or money. Suppose, he says, he 
teaches his dog to chase Dollar bills and to bring them to him 
in exchange for food. Be is still not "buying food" and the 
bills are not "money" to him. Searle's dog cannot represent 
to itself the relevant deontic features of money (its place in 
a system of practices). The dog might reason "if I give him 
this he will give me that". But it cannot think "now I have 
the right to buy that". Why not? Because institutional facts 
(and the thoughts they make possible) are restricted to 
language-users and are themselves language-dependent. Self-
reference (and linguistic idealism) is a "problem" only if we 
extend it to the realm of language- and representation-
independent phenomena. If we restrict it to the realm of 
language-dependent institutional facts Searle thinks it is not 
a problem at all. It actually helps explain how institutional 
facts are possible. 1 
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Searle thinks that there are features of the world that are 
"intrinsic", like mountains and mol.ecules, that don't depend 
for their existence on our perceptions or representations of 
them and "don't give a damn about observors" (1995: 11) . As 
against this there are "observor relative" features of the 
world that depend for their existence on the way they are 
collectively represented as being. This "ontological" 
distinction boils down to an epistemic distinction that Searle 
just mentions in passing (1995:33) between "natural" and 
"institutional" concepts. Natural concepts are concepts of 
objects whose objects are "independent" of those concepts. 
Institutional concepts are concepts of objects whose objects 
are "constituted" by those concepts. This distinction is a 
condition of Searle's analysis. 2 It is a consequence of this 
distinction, and not Searl.e's derivative distinction between 
"intrinsic" and observor relative features of the world, that 
"there is a way that things are that is independent of all 
representations of how things are" (1995: 137) Searl.e call.s 
this "External Realism". Be doesn't think external realism can 
be proved, but he thinks it is logical.ly implied by his 
analysis of institutional facts. 3 
The basic problem with Searle's account of real.ism (defended in 
his Chapters Seven and Eight) is that he advances several 
different, and inconsistent, conceptions of "intrinsic features" 
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of the wor1d. On one account they are brute facts. On 
another account they are unknowab1e noumena, and on yet another 
account they are high1y idea1ized constructions. Sear1e gives 
the fo11owing examp1es of intrinsic features of the wor1d: 
"fie1ds of force", "atoms", "mo1ecu1es". But these are hard1y 
Anscombe-type brute facts. Anscombe-type brute facts are 1umps 
of coa1, stones, marks on a piece of paper, sounds, etc, and 
other things that institutiona1 rea1ity is supposed to "bottom 
out" in. 
Now here is the prob1em. Sear1e says that "proper1y 
understood" rea1ism is "not a thesis about how the wor1d is in 
fact" (1995: 155) . "Rea1ism does not say how things are but 
on1y that there is a way that they are" (1995: 155) , and 
"things" in the previous c1ause "is not a referring expression" 
- it is 1ike the "it" in "it is raining" (1995: 155) . But what 
kind of rea1ism is this? It is c1ear1y not any kind of brute 
fact rea1ism. It sounds 1ike an empty Kantian rea1ism. When 
Sear1e says that it is "consistent with rea1ism to suppose that 
any kind of 'view' of rea1ity is quite impossib1e" (1995: 154) 
he fa1sifies, by intellectua1izing, brute fact rea1ism. Be 
writes for example as if he thinks that atoms and mo1ecules are 
brute physica1 facts. But it wou1d be absurd, on Sear1e's own 
principles, to arque that the object of the concept of an atom 
is something that is representation- or 1anguage-independent. 
"Atoms" and "mo1ecu1es" are in the same genera1 category as 
"rights" and "points". 
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They are constituted by our 
representations of and theories about them. Object and content 
coincide, ie, the object of the idea is nowhere to be found. 
except within the very idea. These phenomena are hardly the 
bedrock upon which we superimpose institutional facts. They 
are themselves institutional facts. Searle might rejoin that 
"whatever the word 'atom' refers to, it is independent of our 
representation of it". But this is an entirely empty idea. 
The whole bloc of scientific theory in physics and chemistry 
would be empty and meaningless if the phenomena they described 
were representation- and language-independent. 
Al.most as if he were creasing swords with Durkheim, the firat 
line of Searle's Introduction emphatically says that we live in 
one world: "not two or three or seventeen" (1995:xi). I think 
Searle is wrong about this. Dogs live in one world the 
world of brute facts. People also live in that world, but in 
addition they live in a world of institutional facts. A subset 
of those institutional facts are conceptions about physical 
reality. But these language-dependent conceptions do not ref er 
to phenomena that are independent of them. They cannot, 
because they are self-referential. So Searle's claim is either 
wrong or misleading. Durkheim was probably closer to the truth 
when he wrote that "there really are two sources of life that 
are different and virtually antagonistic in which we 
participate simultaneously" (1984: 65) . Searle actually seems 
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to admit as much when he says, somewhere in his book, that we 
live in a state of nature all the time (by which I assume he 
means in a world of Anscombe-type brute facts) and a world of 
institutional facts. This idea does not commit us to the 
absurdity that these two "worlds" are not part of the same 
reality. This is just a manner of speech. These two worlds, 
or "levels" of reality, are logically and conceptually 
interconnected. 
of meaning. 
There are, and must be, behavioural correlates 
For a long time now Searle has been arguing for a conceptual 
monism according to which the world can be described in a 
sinqle idiom in which all facts can be cross-referenced and 
indexed to each other . The attainment of a single conceptual 
currency is at least as important for intellectual advance as 
the attainment of money is for the furtherance of commerce. 
But I don't think Searle has gone about the job of arguing for 
his conceptual monism in the right way. Searle says the bare-
bones of his ontology is that we live in a world made up 
entirely of "physical particles in fields of force". But what 
kind of world is this? Dogs don't live in that world. It is 
only people who think they live in a world of intangible 
"fields" of "force". Physical reality is a world of brute 
facts. Fields of force, like rights, are ontologically 
subjective. The only objectivity they admit of is epistemic. 
Fields of force are real in Physics 101, but dogs and 
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unsocialized people know nothinq about Physics 101 because they 
are not university students and they do not live in that world. 
If Searle wants to draw a "continuous line" from molecules to 
mountains to money he should read Anscombe-type brute facts as 
constructed. But Searle refuses to do this because it would 
undercut his arqument that institutional facts bottom out in 
(unconstructed) brute facts, and also because he thinks we 
typically have direct perception of brute facts. By 
stipulation, brute facts are unconstructed lanquaqe-independent 
phenomena. Searle thinks there is a stratum of reality that 
people (and also doqs, etc.) typically seem to perceive 
directly, without any intervention of representations of any 
kind. But he should know that this must be a fairly narrow 
band of phenomena that mammals are finely tuned into, just 
because of the nature of the physical orqanism. It seems more 
l.ikel.y that, often, in order to coqnize somethinq we must 
remake it in our mind. 
Who or what does the remakinq? I don't see how any 
constructionist account of social. reality can avoid askinq 
these questions. Socioloqists wil.l .tel.l. you without hesitation 
that it is the Self that does the remakinq. One of the most 
surprisinq and, indeed, remarkable features of Searle's book is 
that it is devoid of any conception of the social. self. 
Searle thinks his worries have nothinq to do with Mead's Mind, 
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Self and Society (1934), but he must be regarded as mistaken 
about this. Mead's theory has everything to do with his 
worries (more on this below) . 
What we find in Searle's book in lieu of any treatment of the 
self is an account (in Chapter Six) of something he calls 
Background and "the mechanism". Searle's Background is not a 
new idea. 
how, etc. 
It consists in S-R-type dispositions, habits, know-
Searle ascribes no intentionality to Background, 
even though he thinks it contains perceptual and linguistic 
structures that enable us to "see as", "hear as", "read as", 
and so on. According to Searle institutional reality (and also 
physical reality) imprints designs and causal structures on the 
mechanism (1995:146). The mechanism, when confronted with the 
appropriate occasion of behaviour or state of affairs, matches 
the situation at hand with the applicable Background phenomena 
and these conjunctions "cause" predictable behaviour. The 
mechanism "determines" the right (or expected) response. In 
turn, the mechanism has been programmed to function as it does 
by institutional reality via a system of rewards and 
punishments. Searle thinks that dispositions, once acquired, 
become automatic and are mechanically applied. They are a 
"category of neurophysiological causation" (1995: 129) that we 
"describe at a higher level as rule-following". 
Searle is clearly right to think that a lot of human behaviour 
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is automatic and mechanical most of the time. It is even 
possible to motorize hiqher level functions of the brain (as 
in neqotiatinq a car through traffic, or a tour-quide 
"spontaneously" reciting a patter) . Searle talks about the 
"man who is at home in his world" (1995:147) as having 
developed the ability to act naturally in his society because 
the mechanism has developed these abilities to perfection. But 
this sounds like an armchair idealization to me. Society is 
usually full of ambiguity and struggle. Things are not so 
simple. There are of course people who do act (think and 
speak) in stereotyped and predictable ways. Searle takes these 
people (e.g. professional baseball players) as exemplifying 
human behaviour. Be says he wants a "causal explanation" of 
behaviour "that will explain complexity and spontaneity", but 
there is nothing in his model that allows for spontaneity of 
any kind. 
To act, on Searle's model, the actor need only apply a simple 
matching algorithm. Once a situation's meaning is apparent, 
itself an automatic happening, the relevant dispositions, etc., 
flash as impulses that are translated into action. But in 
social life the meaning of a situation is usually never 
completely given to us, as if it were just a question of our 
perceiving the transparent essence of some natural object, and 
even natural objects have a haze of indeterminacy about them. 
Searle models actors as being "outside" of the situations they 
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encounter (more on this below), but this is not possible. The 
methods they use to assemble, recognize and realize a setting's 
features are a family of interactional practices. Searle would 
have us believe that these reflexions can be reduced to a set 
of mechanical formulae in accordance with exceptionless laws. 
Perhaps. But he has not shown this and his baseball examples 
beg the question. The basic problem with Searle's account of 
social action is that he models it as being outside of social 
scenes, or interaction of any kind. In order to see this 
consider the two diagrams that Searle introduces (1995:26): 
Figure 1.1 - The Individualist Model 
We Intend 
believe, 
Figure 1.2 - Searle's Model 
believe, 
believe, 
intend, 
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Searle introduces these two simple diagrams in order to show 
how his model of collective intentionality differs from 
individualism. Be claims that individualists are guilty of 
blunder when they "reduce" collective intentionality to first-
person intentionality. Searle does not claim that his model 
excludes individual intentionality. Searle' s actor may have 
the singular intention to block the defensive end but he has 
that intention as part of the team's collective intentionality 
to execute a pass play. The individualists and Searle share 
a major assumption: that representations of any kind exist "in 
the head" of this or that individual. But this is difficult 
to square with common sense. A system of signs or currency 
for example could hardly be located in the head of any one 
individual. Or consider reason: it is a feature of reason that 
it cannot be fully developed in the lifetime of a single 
individual. No one for example could invent the whole of 
mathematics or a legal system out of their own head. 
Searle attributes an argument to individualists that he thinks 
is fallacious, namely that from the true proposition that "all 
intentionality exists in the heads of individual human beings" 
they draw the false conclusion that "intentionality can make 
reference only to the individuals in whose heads it exists" 
(1995: 25) . This is a spectacular non-sequitur but it's not the 
way individualists actually reason. What Searle should've said 
is that they reduce social and institutional concepts to 
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natural concepts . According to Searle' s model individuals 
think in both natural and institutional concepts. It is 
because individualists restrict human thinking to natural 
concepts that they think singular intentionality (which is a 
brute fact phenomenon) is the only kind of intentionality there 
can be. 
Searle distances himself from the individualists by introducing 
social and institutional concepts in order to account for the 
possibility of collective intentionality. This seems plausible 
enough on the surface but a closer inspection of Searle's model 
reveals that it cannot possibly account for plural subject 
phenomena. To see why consider this model: 
Figure 1.3 - The Interactionist Model 
If Searle looks at Figure 1.3 he will see that it contains an 
element that does not exist in Figures 1.1 or 1. 2. Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 show two individuals. Figure 1.3 also shows two 
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individuals, but in addition it shows a shaded area of 
interface. This shaded area represents interaction. 
Socioloqists who have absorbed Mead's theory call this portion 
of reality "self" and "society". Fiqure 1.1 shows two solitary 
individuals. They live in a world of brute facts only. Since 
they only think in natural concepts, there can be no social or 
institutional facts in this world. Searle's model introduces 
the idea of social and institutional concepts and facts. But 
these phenomena are not possible outside of interaction. 
Interaction is a logical condition of collective 
intentionality. And interaction cannot be located "in the 
head" of any one individual. That is an impossibility. So 
there is really nothinq to distinquish Searle' s model from 
individualism. Neither model allows for interaction, and so 
neither can account for the possibility of collective 
intentionality or plural subject phenomena of any kind. 
Socioloqy is concerned with action as opposed to nonmeaninqful 
behaviour. Acts do not usually occur as isolated events but 
are usually linked to each other as actors respond to and 
anticipate the actions of others. The process of interaction 
is at the core of socioloqical interest. 
Many philosophers (Searle included) think that socioloqical 
explanation should take the deductive form characteristic of 
the natural sciences. Behaviour is accounted for in terms of 
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dispositions. Dispositions are usually regarded as rules that 
have been internalized or learned. Interaction is regarded as 
"rule-governed" in the sense that patterns of behaviour are 
rendered intelligible and are explainable in terms of these 
rules. 
It is however vital to note that "situations" and "actions" are 
not concrete events with unique locations in space and time. 
The same situation can recur and actions can be repeated. This 
means that concrete occasions and behaviours must be treated as 
instances, or tokens, of type-like situations and actions. The 
way in which an actor discriminates situations and actions is 
critical. This involves judgements. Users of concepts make 
judgements which involve the ability to subsume occasions of 
behaviour under categories. It is on this basis that ltant 
distinguishes humans from infrahuman beings which, he thought, 
are caused to act by dipositional properties determined by laws 
of nature that a natural scientist could observe and codify. 
If social interactions and thus social structures, are to be 
stable, different participants must discriminate situations and 
actions in virtually the same way. Otherwise rules could not 
be invoked to account for or explain the stable structure of 
society. Thus, an element of substantial congnitive consensus 
among actors must be assumed if this model is to be of any 
use. Typically this takes the form of an assumption that the 
-55-
actors have been socialized into a "common culture" that 
includes a system of symbols and meanings, particularly a 
language. Different definitions of situations and actions do 
occur, but the assumption of cognitive consensus is retained by 
treating such deviations as emanating from different 
subcultural definitions or idiosyncratic deviations resulting 
from accidents of individual biography. 
In the flow of group life there are many points at which 
actors are redefining the situation and each other's acts. The 
process has been called the documentary method of 
interpretation by Garfinkel (1967). According to Wilson 
(1970:68) documentary interpretation consists in identifying an 
underlying pattern behind a series of appearances such that 
each appearance is seen as referring to, is an expression of, 
or a "document of", the underlying pattern. However, the 
underlying pattern itself is identified through its individual, 
concrete appearances, so that the appearances reflecting the 
pattern and the pattern itself mutually determine one another 
in the same way that "part" and "whole" mutually determine each 
other in gestalt phenomena. 
The mutual determination of appearances and underlying patterns 
is called by Garfinkel "indexicality" and a particular 
appearance is called an "indexical particular". The concept of 
documentary interpretation was adapted from Mannheim by 
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Garfinkel. The term "indexical" is taken from Bar-Hillel 
(1954) who defined an indexical expression as one that depends 
for its meaning on the context in which it is produced. The 
term "indexical particular" is a generalization of indexical 
expression to include nonlinguistic as well as linguistic 
events. 
A central characteristic of documentary interpretation is that 
later appearances may force a revision in the perceived 
underlying pattern that in turn compels a reinterpretation of 
what previous appearances "really were". In addition, on any 
given occasion present appearances are interpreted partially on 
the basis of what the underlying pattern projects as the future 
course of events. One may have to await further developments 
to understand the meaning of present appearances. Thus, the 
"meaning" of a situation or an action is never completely given 
in the situation or action itself. In this sense, documentary 
interpretation is "retrospective" and "prospective" (Cicourel, 
1974: 54-55; Garfinkel 1967). 
Interaction is a process in which participants engage in 
documentary interpretation of situations and each other's 
actions, etc. What makes interaction problematical is that 
context itself is "seen for what it is" through the same 
actions it is used to interpret. That is, on any particular 
occasion in the course of interaction, the actions that the 
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participants see each other performing are seen as such in 
terms of the meaning of the context, and the context in turn 
"is understood to be what it is through these same actions" 
(Wilson 1970:64). Further, "what the situation on any 
particular occasion is understood to have been may be revised 
subsequently in light of later events. Consequently, what the 
situation "really was" and what the actors "really did" on a 
particular occasion are continually open to redefinition. It 
thus becomes apparent that definitions of situations and 
actions are not explicitly or implicitly assumed to be settled 
once and for all by a literal application of a pre-existing 
established system of symbols. Rather, the "meanings of 
situations and actions are interpretations formulated on 
particular occasions by participants in the interaction and are 
subject to reformulation on subsequent occasions" (Wilson 
1970:64). As Blumer says: If the fundamental process in 
interaction is documentary interpretation "the study of 
interaction would have to be made from the position of the 
actor. . . since action is forged by the actor out of what he 
perceives, interprets and judges ... in short, one would have to 
take the role of the actor and see the world from his 
standpoint" (1966: 542) . 
Descriptions of social scenes, situations and actions may be 
called interpretive description. And the characteristics of 
interpretive descriptions are incompatible with the logic of 
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deductive explanation in the covering law model. Literal 
description is taken for granted in the natural sciences. 
Problems of description tend to be treated as practical matters 
of competent technique rather that as posing fundamental 
methodological questions. In the natural sciences a literal 
description amounts to asserting that some phenomenon has some 
clearly designated property, or what is logically the same 
thing, belongs to some particular well-defined class of 
phenomena. To treat a description as literal it must be taken 
for granted that the description of a phenomenon as an 
"instance" of a class specifies explicitly the particular 
features of the phenomenon. A second assumption is that the 
features on which the classification is based are demonstrably 
recognizable by any competent member of the relevant scientific 
community. 
Sociological investigation depends on descriptions of 
interactions. If sociological explanations are to be 
deductive, as Searle thinks, these descriptions must be taken 
to be literal. But it is difficult to see how this can be. 
In describing interaction the observor necessarily imputes an 
underlying pattern that serves as the essential context for 
"seeing" what the situations and actions are, while at the same 
time the situations and actions are a necessary resource for 
seeing what the context is. Thus, the observor's 
classification of the behaviour of an actor on a given occasion 
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in the course of interaction as an instance of a particular 
type of action is not based on a limited set of specifiable 
features of the behaviour and the occasion but, rather, depends 
on the indefinite context seen as relevant by the observor, a 
context that gets its meaning partly through the very action 
it is being used to interpret. Moreover, though the behaviour 
of an actor on a given occasion may be classified as an 
instance of some particular type of action, this classification 
is indefinitely revisable on the basis of later events or 
further information. 
It is for example a familiar experience in social interaction 
for people to explain what they previously meant by some 
previous gesture or utterance. Such reinterpretations are 
frequently accepted at face value and in good faith, thus 
sometimes altering the course of interaction on the basis of 
a new understanding of what was previously meant. In 
ethnographic studies of interaction it is not uncommon for the 
ethnographer to understand what the events recorded in his 
notes "really" consist of only in the light of subsequent 
events and often only after he has left the field altogether. 
Utterances and displays which had no clear or determinate 
meaning may later acquire determinate meaning in light of 
information subsequently obtained. 
The description of interaction cannot be treated as literal. 
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Meanings and definitions of situations have their "objectivity" 
established through the interpretive processes of interaction 
rather than by reference to a body of culturally given 
constitutive rules. The problem of understanding the reflexive 
nature of interaction is centrally important for understanding 
social facts. 
Notes 
1. Searle' s arqument is an original invention, but it is not 
without precursors. Consider Durkheim's claim: "there is one 
division of nature where the formula of idealism is applicable 
almost to the letter: this is the social kingdom. Here more 
than anywhere else the idea is the reality" (1915: 228, 
emphasis added). It is even possible to trace Searle's self-
reference thesis back to Hegel's concept-object identity 
theory. Hegel was, after all, talking about social objects 
when he wrote that "it is a mistake to imagine that the objects 
which form the content of our mental ideas come first and that 
our subjective agency supervenes, and by the ... operation of 
abstraction, and by colligating the points possessed in common 
by the objects, frames concepts of them. Rather ... the things 
are what they are through the action of the concept, immanent 
in them, and revealing itself in them" (1873: 163, emphasis 
added). 
2. This is an epistemological distinction of the first importance. 
Consider Schlick's version of it: "[T]his distinction between 
ideas and objects of ideas [being independent] ... makes sense 
in the case of concrete ideas; after all, I distinguish between 
the book lying in front of me on the table and my idea of that 
book. But in the case of abstract ideas, object and content 
co-incide, i.e., the object of the idea is nowhere to be found, 
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except within the very idea" (1910: 407). 
3. Searle argues that "there has to be some physical realization" 
of institutional facts (1995:56). "It could not be the case, 
as some antirealists have maintained, that all facts are 
institutional facts" (1995:56). Money, for example, must come 
in "some physical form" (1995: 35) . A socially constructed 
reality presupposes a reality independent of all social 
construction "because there has to be somethinq for the 
construction to be constructed out of" (1995:190). 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
-62-
SOCIAL REALISM THE EXTERIORITY OF 
SOCIAL FACTS. 
Searle accounts for the behaviour of his mechanism in part by 
something 
reality. 
"outside" of individual people, namely social 
Durkheim also claimed that society exerts a 
constraining pattern on individual actors. "Exteriority" is 
one of the features claimed by him to characterize social 
facts. But in what sense are social facts "out there" as 
against "in here" (in the head as Searle would say?) . Is it 
really sensible to suppose that social facts, abstract social 
generalizations, have existence "outside" of the minds of 
concrete people? 
In this chapter I will clarify and defend Durkheim's Hegelian 
view that collective representations exist independently of and 
"external to" individuals, and that they cannot without 
remainder be reduced to psychological or behaviouristic 
phenomena. By explaining Durkheim's theory in the idiom of 
Bart and Searle I am able to trace out leitfaden between the 
concept of a social fact and the theories of holism and 
individualism. 
In a classic article Philippa R. Foot noted that: 
When anthropologists or sociologists look at 
contemporary moral philosophy they must be struck by 
a fact about it which is indeed remarkable: that 
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mora1ity is 
phenomenon. 
mora1s first 
no t treated as essentia11y a socia1 
Where they themse1 ves wou1d think of 
of a11 in connection with ... the 
regu1ation of behaviour in and by society, 
phi1osophers common1y take a different starting 
point. What the phi1osopher does is to ask himse1f 
what it is to make a mora1 judgement, or to take up 
a mora1 attitude, and he tries to give the ana1ysis 
in terms of e1ements such as 
thought, which are found in 
(1977: 229). 
fee1ing, 
a sing1e 
action and 
individua1 
Socio1ogists, as this 1earned phi1osopher notes, do not usua11y 
take the individua1 as the starting point of ana1ysis but 
rather the group of which the individua1 is a part constitutes 
the fundamenta1 unit of ana1ysis, or if not the group, then at 
1east the "ro1e" the individua1 occupies is taken to be 
primary. But because of the starting point taken by 
phi1osophers the notion of "socia1 facts" has been thought to 
be suspect by many. Nowhere is this suspicion more apparent 
than in the controversy between the methodo1ogica1 
individua1ists and ho1ists. In the main, the individua1ists 
have been phi1osophers cast in the traditiona1 empiricist mo1d. 
They have been inc1ined, that is, to the view that what is 
"rea1" is that which can be seen or that which is sensib1e, 
and that which is in princip1e unobservab1e or insensib1e (1ike 
abstractions) has been thought to be, fundamenta11y, "unrea1". 
Since socia1 facts cannot be observed but individua1 peop1e 
can, they reason, the 1atter are rea1 and the former are not, 
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and all statements about the behaviour of groups, and all use 
of group-type concepts to describe the behaviour of 
individuals, can ultimately be "reduced" to statements about 
the feelings, beliefs and dispositions of individuals, for what 
else is there? Most philosophers have been perfectly ready to 
accept the existence of "brute" facts (and certainly Kant and 
Wittgenstein are no exceptions to this rule). But philosophers 
have been inclined to treat social facts as being in a suspect 
category of phenomena. 
In the 1950s the debate about social facts was rejuvenated by 
the controversy between the individualists and holists. 
Mandlebaum (1955) argued persuasively in an influential article 
that "societal facts" (as he called social facts) are "as 
ultimate as psychological facts" and "cannot be reduced without 
remainder to concepts that refer to the thoughts and actions 
of specific individuals" (1955:6). Amongst Mandlebaum's 
critics was Watkins who summarized his antithesis by saying 
that "the ultimate constituents of the social world are people" 
(1959: 505) . There is no need to reconsider the gamut of side 
and ancillary issues raised by the Mandlebaum-Watkins 
controversy here. It is, I think, better to relate the 
controversy to the theories of Bart, Searle and Durkheim. 
These writers have argued that traditional empiricist modes of 
explaining social behaviour cannot explain nor account for the 
existence of obligations. Since the controversy about the 
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nature of social facts has so far not been construed broadly 
enough to include the work of these philosophers, and since 
their theories help to locate the controversy within a larger 
context, it is certainly worth our while to examine them here. 
One of the reasons why Searle's controversial derivation of an 
"ought" from an "is" (1964) has had and still has so many 
philosophers scratching their heads is that he was outre enough 
to introduce the notion of "institutional facts" into 
philosophical discourse at a time when very few others were 
sensitized to this idea. Searle used the existence of 
institutional facts to explain how evaluative conclusions could 
be drawn from factual or descriptive premises. Even though it 
provoked a spate of reply and rejoinder and rebuttals to 
rejoinders to replies and so on, Searle' s derivation of an 
"ought" from an "is" was simple enough. He argued this way: 
from the fact that Jones promised to pay Smith five Dollars no 
one would disagree that he, Jones, ought to pay Smith five 
Dollars, all things being equal. Some attacked the ceteris 
paribus rider, others denounced the deduction as a fraud, and 
still others simply denied that Jones ought to do anything at 
all, if he is not so inclined. What Searle says about his 
deduction is that it is possible only because of the 
institution of promising. If the institution did not exist, 
then Jones' utterance "I hereby . " promise ... would have no 
effect on Jones' moral situation or upon what he "ought" to do. 
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But underlying the institution of promising are certain 
constitutive rules to the effect that utterances of the kind 
"I hereby promise ... etc." count~ promising, and "promising 
involves the undertaking of an obligation" (1969: 33-34). 
Searle gives as a formula for constitutive rules "X counts as 
y in context C" I where X is a brute description of certain 
things in the world, and where Y is an institutional state of 
affairs. Without constitutive rules the description "they 
played football" or "Jones made a promise" cannot be given. 
It is possible that twenty-two men might line up and go through 
the same physical movements as are gone through by two teams 
at a football game, but if there were no rules of football, 
that is, no antecedently existing game of football, there is 
no sense according to Searle in which their behaviour could be 
described as playing football. Constitutive rules give sense 
to the activities of individuals. They create and define "new 
forms of behaviour" according to Searle. 
What we must do now is question the "ontological" status of 
constitutive rules. The question can be generalized: what are 
abstractions, how are they possible, and what does it mean to 
say that they exist? Though many empiricist philosophers have 
grown tired of asking such questions good answers to them may 
help to clarify, if not resolve, the controversy between those 
who believe that social facts are "real", and those who either 
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deny their existence or, what is more likely, covertly attempt 
to reduce them to physical or, in the dualistic version, 
physical and mental phenomena. I will argue that the question 
of the reality of social facts is identical with the question 
of the existence and reality of social rules, for what are 
social rules and abstractions if not social facts? 
Rules according to Hart's scheme necessarily involve reference 
to something that is "outside" of the individual. What is it? 
It is a certain "pattern of behaviour" that exists 
independently of and external to the individuals who learn to 
recognize and use them as guides to conduct and as the basis 
for claims, demands, admissions, etc. We must learn to"see" 
these patterns. This is what socialization is all about. 
Gellner clarifies this by noting that individuals think in 
institutional concepts (in addition to empirical concepts). 
What this amounts to, in Gellner's view, is that individuals 
are capable of isolating and reacting to certain "patterns" in 
their environment. The pattern abstracted, however, is 
according to Gellner "not merely abstracted", but it is "really 
there" ( 1959: 498) . This raises the issue of the "exteriori ty" 
of social rules. The common (or shared) standards, can be 
thought of as shared meanings, or what Durkheim called 
collective representations (and what Searle calls constitutive 
rules) . Simmel would have called them social generalizations 
or abstractions. Collective representations, Durkheim tells 
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us, presuppose the existence of certain "sensible indices" or 
"visible patterns" and the extent to which such indices or 
patterns (the external aspect of rules) and "sensible" or 
"visible" varies in animals from those, like dogs and horses, 
that have scant ability to recognize them to those, like 
humans, who have the cognitive capacity of thinking 
"symbolically" and in hierarchical and systemic ways. 
Viewed strictly from the external or "physical" point of view, 
spoken language is no more than brute phonetic utterances; a 
coin or a Dollar bill is no more than a piece of metal or a 
piece of paper with grey and green ink on it, etc. We have 
institutional concepts which we use to describe these 
institutional facts (and artifacts) , and if we try to reduce 
these to "natural" concepts (what Kant called empirical 
concepts) which have as their referents mere brute phonetic 
utterances (in the case of language) or pieces of metal or 
paper (in the case of money) , what is lost is an entire 
dimension of the social life being described. If human beings 
like prelinguistic animals were able to think only in terms of 
natural concepts referring to physical objects in the world, 
they would be unable to recognize much less build their lives 
around and participate in institutional forms of behaviour. A 
rudimentary system or kinship would not even be possible, 
because without constitutive rules creating and defining the 
roles of "husband" and "wife" the institution of marriage could 
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not exist. Without institutional concepts and the institutional 
facts they make possible human beings could perhaps "run in 
packs" but group life as we know it could not exist. 
Constitutive rules make group life and society possible. They 
create the very possibility of forming social relationships, 
obligations and social structures, and until their importance 
is accepted (by behaviourists)and understood (by reductionists) 
we shall be unable to properly understand the whole distinctive 
style of human thought, speech and action which is involved in 
the existence of rules and which constitutes the normative 
structure of society. 
Why then do so many still adhere to the idea that institutional 
concepts can be reduced without remainder to concepts which 
refer only to brute facts? 
answer to this question. 
We have already considered Searle's 
The model for systematic knowledge 
of ~ kind is thought to be simple empirical observations 
recording sense experience. This is the model, according to 
Searle, that is causing most of the trouble. Be identifies 
areas of apparently fact-stating language which do not consist 
of concepts which are a part of this model institutional 
concepts. Now, according to Gellner, what is at issue (at 
bottom) in the controversy between the methodological holists 
and individualists is the "ontological" status of the phenomena 
that institutional concepts refer to and describe. While the 
notion of "ontological status" is never as clear as it could 
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be, one thing is clear and this is that the things referred to 
by institutional concepts exist in and by virtue of rules. 
These rules themselves consist of more elemental ingredients. 
They consist not only of mental phenomena (attitudes), and 
physical phenomena (patterns of behaviour), but also abstract 
phenomena (social generalizations) . The social generalizations 
are always self-referential. This makes them quite different 
from natural concepts. The interactional patterns of behaviour 
which constitutive rules create and define are "out there". 
They are certainly not "in the head". If we have been 
properly socialized, we have the tools we need to grasp and use 
them. They are in other words group phenomena, or properties, 
and they cannot be reduced to properties, or concepts used to 
describe the properties, of natural or brute phenomena, even 
though they exist side-by-side with the latter. 
When we look at a work of impressionistic art, for example, we 
find that if we stand to near it we cannot make out its 
object. Then, as we stand back at just the right distance, a 
"pattern" comes into view. We undergo a similar cognitive 
experience as we are socialized into a group, or as we learn 
a language. Patterns become visible to us as we become members 
of the group or speech community. As we become familiar with 
the ways of the group, be begin to recognize certain patterns 
of behaviour which are taken by the group as shared or common 
standards of behaviour. It could of course be supposed that 
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in the case of a work of impressionistic art the pattern is 
being "imposed" on the canvas by the mind of the individual 
viewer - that it is not "really there". But if a pattern is an 
intelligible configuration of elements - that is to say, part 
of the intelligible world - this is yet another sense in which 
it can be said to exist "out there" in the world, and not 
merely "in here" in the mind (or head) of an individual viewer. 
This is the kind of claim, I think, that Durkheim and Hegel 
both put regarding the "ontological" status of institutional 
facts. Of course, it takes certain training, skill and 
capacity (sometimes called "competence" by learning theorists 
or linguists) to be able to recognize the patterns of behaviour 
which constitute the intelligible world of human thought, 
speech and action. But the claim is that these patterns really 
are there to be discovered, or learned, and that they are group 
properties which cannot be reduced to nor explained in terms 
of physical or mental properties alone (although both of these 
types of properties are involved) . This is certainly 
Durkheim's claim. Be argued throughout that social facts could 
not be reduced to psychological facts, that the former are ~ 
generis and exist on another "level" than psychological 
phenomena. Kant's Bumean-based model of understanding is 
inconsistent with this picture. 
A second index (along side of "exteriority") of the ontological 
status of the phenomena referred to by institutional concepts 
noted by Durkheim is 
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"constraint". Be 
institutional facts can "constrain" individuals. 
accepts that 
'l'his model is 
a different model of social causation than the one proposed by 
Searle. Durkheim is not necessarily saying that institutional 
facts "cause" people to do certain things. It is rather that 
they can "give cause" or provide reasons for actions. While 
it may not be true that institutional facts can have an effect 
on behaviour in the same way that a billiard ball struck 
squarly (or otherwise) can have an effect on another billiard 
ball, it still makes sense to say that institutional facts can 
constrain us and that indeed they do. Group membership 
constitutes an enormous structure of rights and duties which 
exerts a constant and indeed a crushing influence on 
individuals. And any attempt to argue, as for example Watkins 
does, that "an individual's personality is a system of 
unobservable dispositions which, together with factual 
believers, determine observable behaviour" (1973:104) leaves an 
entire dimension of social life unanalyzed and badly explained. 
Indeed, often the explanation of an individual's behaviour 
demands the introduction of concepts referring to societal 
status. A person's behaviour may sometimes be made more 
intelligible by viewing it as a species of role behaviour. It 
would be difficult to reduce many of the concepts used to 
characterize role-relationships and rule behaviour to 
psychological concepts having to do with feelings, motives and 
beliefs alone. The reason is that the incumbents of such roles 
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are the bearers of rights and duties which define these roles. 
They are "constrained" by such roles (though of course they are 
sometimes free to ignore or resist this constraint) . 
Structures of rights and obligations exist in the same way that 
rules and social generalizations or abstractions exist, and 
these also "constrain" individuals who are subject to them. 
This is illustrated most clearly by examining the notion of 
social obligation. Thus, the statement that an individual has 
an obligation, e.g., to pay Smith five Dollars, to stop at a 
red light, to report for military duty or to care for one's 
off spring, remains true even if he believes (reasonably or 
unreasonably) that he will never be found out and has nothing 
to fear from disobedience. This indicates the general 
irrelevance of an individual's beliefs, fears and motives to 
the question of whether he has an obligation. A person has an 
obligation if his case falls under a rule or a social 
generalization with society's stamp on it, and rules and social 
generalizations, as group properties, cannot be reduced 
(without remainder) to the dispositions or beliefs of 
individuals. The jurist John Austin, seeing the general 
irrelevance of a person's beliefs, fears and motives to the 
question of whether he has an obligation, defined the notion 
of obligation not in terms of these subjective facts, but in 
terms of the objective chances or liklihood that certain 
officials or others would behave in certain ways. And Hayek 
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has arqued that "there is no other way toward an understanding 
of socia1 phenomena but through an understanding of individua1 
actions directed toward and guided by expected behaviour" 
(1949: 6) . But these individua1istic modes of ana1ysis obscure 
the facts that where ru1es and socia1 genera1izations exist, 
deviations from them are not mere1y grounds for a prediction 
that hosti1e reactions wi11 fo1low, but are a1so a "reason" and 
a "justification" for such actions. From the interna1 point 
of view of group members rules and social genera1izations are 
used as guides to socia1 1ife and as the basis of criticism 
and punishment. Rules and socia1 genera1izations give them 
"reasons" for behaving in one way rather than another. 
So, if we insist on ana1ysing socia1 behaviour, inc1uding 
language, from an individualistic perspective in terms of 
motives, fee1ings, be1iefs and habits of individua1 people, 
what is left out is the socia1 or "symbo1ic" dimension of human 
1ife. Thus, when Ry1e wrote the Concept Qf. Mind in the 1ate 
1940s his individualistic mode of ana1ysis comp1ete1y 1eft out 
of the picture the group and symbo1ic properties of human 
social and communicative behaviour. This exp1ains why there 
appears no reference in that work at al1 to George Herbert 
Mead's wide1y read and inf1uential Mind. Se1f and Society, 
which had appeared in 1934. Ry1e and Mead began with entire1y 
different starting points. And the two works are as different 
from one another as individua1 psychology is from socio1ogy. 
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In many ways the starting point of Hart is much closer to that 
of Mead and Durkheim than it is to Hume, Kant or Ryle. Both 
Hart and Searle deviate from the empiricist-individualist model 
of knowledge and analysis set down by Hume, Kant and classical 
18th Century empiricist epistemology. 
The converse methodological doctrine is that social or group 
phenomena are intentional and teleological, and one of the 
salient themes of modern sociology is that description of 
distinctively social phenomena must involve understanding of 
the situation as it is apprehended by the agent. It must 
therefore make reference to the conceptual framework of the 
agent, and while institutional concepts used by sociologists 
might be eliminable or reduced to natural concepts referring to 
brute physical phenomena (if all we cared about were the kinds 
of explanations produced by animal psychologists or natural 
science demographers) , it is clear that when used by 
participants or group members they are not. These 
institutional concepts and the "things" they refer to are "real 
in their consequences", which is just another way of saying 
that they exist independently of and external to individuals, 
and that they cannot be reduced "without remainder" to natural 
concepts having as their referents brute facts. 
CHAPTER FIVE: TWO 
vs. 
-16-
MODELS OF 
BART. 
RULES WITTGENSTEIN 
We must now consider two versions of psycholoqism that Kantian 
philosophers have had a habit of fallinq into: the first is the 
attempt to reduce abstract, social or cultural phenomena - of 
varyinq deqrees of specificity, from the most determinate to 
the most diffuse - to mental phenomena found in the minds of 
concrete individuals. The second psycholoqism, which has often 
been a reaction aqainst the first, is the attempt to reduce 
abstract cultural phenomena to patterns of behaviour, often 
sanctioninq behaviour, that can be detected in the visible 
action of individuals that an external observer could record. 
I will call these two psycholoqisms "mentalism-psycholoqism" 
and "behaviourism-psycholoqism" to distinquish them, 
respectively, from those two slippery impostors, mentalism and 
behaviourism. What is of qreatest interest is not what 
distinquishes these two species of psycholoqism, but what it is 
they have in common. What they seem to have in common is an 
empiricist foundation that qenerates a nominalist impulse to 
reduce abstract phenomena to thinqs (mental and/or physical) 
that are concrete particulars. Popper and Durkheim have laid 
the blame for what they have called "psycholoqism" at the 
doorstep of a refusal to acknowledqe the reality of such 
abstract phenomena. The refusal to accept or to see that 
abstract phenomena have a reality sui generis is often based 
on the supposed obscurity of this claim itself. Wittqenstein 
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is the best-known modern example that can be cited of an 
empiricist philosopher who regards all such talk of abstract 
phenomena as a mistake, or as mystification or obfuscation. 
That was his very foundation, a foundation that is wholly 
endorsed by almost all of analytical philosophy today. The 
deep confusion that this view promotes, however, is only too 
evident from Wittgenstein's perplexed and cryptic jottings, and 
from the crack-up, after more than three decades of commentary, 
of the paradigm his later philosophy established. Today there 
are thousands of commentators who have published books and 
articles on Wittgenstein's work, and there is nothing but 
confusion at the top. So much has been written attempting to 
piece Wittgenstein's ideas together, or tear them to pieces, by 
the method of textual juxtaposition and commentary, that 
further attempts in this line seem unpromising. What seems 
needed is an approach that stands back from the rest to obtain 
an overall picture that can determine in general just what sort 
of method was being followed. While this may sound 
preposterous, it is just what has been attempted by one of 
Wittgenstein's new "sociological" commentators, David Bloor. 
Bloor's goal has been to locate Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
within a tradition: the sociological tradition of Emile 
Durkheim. The so-called "marriage" of Wittgenstein and 
Durkheim has been widely taken for granted lately, but I will 
argue that the marriage is a nullity: it never happened. 
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According to Bloor, Wittgenstein thoroughly "sociologized" 
philosophy by construing meaning and knowledge as social 
accomplishments. Bloor classifies Wittgenstein and Durkheim as 
writers who adopt what he calls a "sociological" approach to 
meaning and necessity. Both thinkers, he claims, regarded 
logical necessity and conceptual constraint as categories of 
moral (or social) obligation. By so doing, they relativized 
objectivity and the foundations of knowledge by reducing them 
to nothing more substantial than ephemeral social constructions 
which can (and do) vary across cultures and over time. But, 
as any familiarity with Durkheim will show, many of these 
constructions are not arbitrary at all. Some of them, rather, 
can be said to be constitutive of humanity itself. Some are 
such that they could not be other than they are, and what we 
know them to be . Durkheim had a deeper insight into the 
nature of the social and the social foundations of knowledge 
than Bloor is willing to admit or perhaps able to see, an 
insight that Wittgenstein himself never caught hold of. The 
truth of the matter is that Durkheim's theory of the social is 
radically at odds with that of Wittgenstein's. Bloor' s attempt 
to locate Wittgenstein's later philosophy within the 
sociological tradition of Durkheim is a failure, but it is an 
instructive failure which points the way to a better 
understanding of what the two sociologisms of Wittgenstein and 
Durkheim really are. This is important because it allows us 
to see just what Wittgenstein's sociologism amounts to, and why 
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and how it must be supplemented. 
Consider the radical interpretation of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy that was given in 1961 by Joseph L. Cowan. In 
Cowan's article, the claim is made that, for Wittgenstein, 
"there is no such thing as a rule" (1961: 364). Cowan went on 
to elaborate upon this remarkable claim: "there is no such 
thing as (or state or condition of) understanding a rule, or 
knowing a rule, or meaning a rule. There is no such thing as 
behaviour guided by, or even according to, a rule" (1961: 364) . 
I believe that Cowan's interpretation is quite right and that 
it is a form of blindness on the part of most contemporary 
commentators that prevents them from seeing that this is so. 
This blindness, which also afflicted Wittgenstein, prevents 
them from seeing that rules, whatever else they may be, are 
also, in part at least, abstract phenomena that cannot be 
reduced (without remainder) to ideas in the minds of 
individuals nor to actions or patterns of behaviour that such 
individuals may display. As I will attempt to indicate below, 
it is precisely this blindness that has bedeviled so much of 
contemporary thinking about Wittgenstein's later philosophy. 
First there are those who have accepted Wittgenstein's rule 
anti-realism. These writers have been led to the most absurd 
conclusions, such as that language use is not necessarily 
governed by rules. Cavell was the first to make this claim: 
he argued that, for Wittgenstein, "everyday language does not, 
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in fact or in essence, depend on ... a structure and conception 
of rules, and yet that. . . absence of such a structure in no 
way impairs its functioning" (1966: 156) , and went on to 
endorse this view and to accept it as a liberation in thought. 
Then there are those writers who have not accepted, or at least 
have not explicitly accepted, Wittgenstein's rule anti-realism. 
These writers have been led into the most tortuous and 
inconclusive attempts ever to explain what "following" a rule 
might amount to, or what behaviour "in accordance with a rule" 
might be. 
Part of the problem has been that no clear conception of a 
rule has emerged in the context of these Wittgensteinian 
problems. We might therefore ask: what did Wittgenstein mean 
by "rule"? What emerges is that he made no distinction at all 
between rules and habits, or custom, and that he defined rules 
in terms of habits. This comes out most clearly when 
considering his two-pronged theory of meaning. The first prong 
of this theory has been widely remarked upon and seems 
generally well-understood. It amounts to the contention, which 
has also been attributed (rightly) to Frege, Durkheim, and 
Popper, among others, that meanings cannot be identified with 
mental states or events in the minds of individuals. 
Bloor (1983) has claimed that this approach to meaning "fits 
snugly into the Durkheimian tradition", but this betrays a 
misunderstanding of Durkheim that is most likely a result of 
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the "blindness" I mentioned above. It is true that both 
Wittgenstein and Durkheim rejected the view that meanings are 
mental, but while Wittgenstein adopted a form of behaviourism-
psychologism, Durkheim adopted a theory of abstract collective 
rep re sen ta tions as part of his own theory of rules. For 
Wittgenstein, we "strike rock bottom" when we come down to 
regular habitual behaviour. But for Durkheim, such behaviour 
gives us evidence for the existence of the abstract, internal 
dimension of rules, a dimension that is entirely missing from 
Wittgenstein's theory of rules-as-habits. 
This brings us to the second prong of Wittgenstein's theory of 
meaning. Wittgenstein could not identify meanings with mental 
phenomena because he realized that meanings were public and 
mental events and states were private, so the next step was to 
identify meanings with social phenomena, which he did regard as 
"public" or external to individuals. Wittgenstein realized 
that without such a public or external criterion for 
determining, and teaching, the correct use of signs, we should 
have no recourse but to private languages, which he rightly 
regarded as impossibilities. The second prong of his theory 
of meaning was the identification of this public criterion with 
publicly observable behaviour which an observer could record. 
This amounted to the identification of rules with habits and 
comes down to a form of behaviourism-psychologism. Thus, his 
sociologism is a form of psychologism and a rejection of 
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abstract phenomena. 
Curiously, Wittgenstein's theory resembles that of the jurist 
John Austin. Austin (1832) was not interested in meaning, but 
in the "objectivity" of obligations. He recognized that 
binding obligations could not be reduced to subjective mental 
or psychological elements. Having seen the general irrelevance 
of a person's feelings, beliefs and wishes to the question of 
whether he or she was objectively under an obligation. Austin 
attempted to define obligation not in terms of these subjective 
elements, but in terms of the objective chances or likelihood 
that certain officials would act in certain ways in cases of 
disobedience. Wittgenstein was searching for objective grounds 
for the possibility of human speech and communication. These 
grounds he found in regular usage, which was to be the 
criterion for correct usage. Both Austin and Wittgenstein 
identified rules, in other words, with what people do "as a 
rule". But these behaviouristic modes of analysis obscure the 
fact that where rules exist, deviations from them are not 
merely grounds for a prediction that hostile reactions will 
follow, but are also a reason and a justification for such 
reactions. From the internal point of view of group members, 
rules are used as guides to social life and as the basis of 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism and punishment. Such 
rules give them reasons for behaving in one way rather than 
another. This, basically, has been H.L.A. Hart's criticism of 
-83-
Austin. I nde ed, the main thrust of his critique of Austin's 
theory of law as the command of the sovereign has been that 
legal obligation cannot be accounted for in terms of the simple 
elements of commands, habitual behaviour, and sanctions - what 
is required is the concept of a rule, a concept that is 
entirely missing from both Austin's and Wittgenstein's analysis 
of the grounds of objective normativity. 
A social rule according to Bart rule has an "internal" aspect 
in addition to an "external" aspect, which it shares with a 
mere social habit and which consists in "regular uniform 
behaviour which an observer could record." (1961:56). Bart is 
quick to point out that this internal aspect of rules is 
sometimes misrepresented as a mere matter of "feelings", but he 
rejects this form of psychologism. Such feelings, he says, are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of binding 
rules. According to Bart, what is necessary is a "critical 
reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a 
common standard" (1961: 56) . This language must be paid close 
attention. These words were not chosen randomly or haphazardly 
in the heat of confusion but form the basis of a very careful 
theory of normative obligation, which applies with equal 
measure to the "must" of conceptual constraint and logical 
necessity as it does to moral and legal obligation. 
be appreciated by examining its formal features: 
This can 
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A. External aspect of rules: "Regular uniform behaviour 
which an observer could record" (1961:56). 
B. Internal aspect of rules: 1) a "critical reflective 
attitude" to certain 2) "patterns of behaviour" as a 3) 
"common standard" (1961: 56) . 
There is a radical difference between this Durkheimian dual 
conception of rules and Wittgenstein's conception of rules as 
observable social habits. Wittgenstein's conception eliminates 
the internal aspect of rules. Notice that the third element 
of the internal aspect, B(3), is abstract and apparently social 
in character. The attitudinal element, B(l), is mental or 
psychological, but notice that the object of the attitude 
itself is something abstract, namely, standards shared by the 
group, and this element cannot be reduced to elements found in 
the mind, such as thoughts, feelings, or beliefs. This 
constitutes a departure from the "justified true belief" theory 
of knowledge which ultimately locates knowledge in the mind of 
the believer. Hart's is a theory, like Popper's, of "objective 
knowledge." The common or shared standards used by the group 
to evaluate knowledge claims, or claims that an individual's 
case falls under a rule, or that someone is under an 
obligation, are abstracted by individuals from actual "patterns 
of behaviour," B (2) , which amount to regular uniform behaviour 
that constitutes the external aspect of rules. It must be 
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noted that these patterns are not "merely" abstracted in 
idiosyncratic ways by individuals but are, as Gellner has 
noted, "really there", as objects to be learned and taught 
which are independent of individual perceptions or 
representations of them. In other words, they are external to 
individuals. Where rules exist, deviations from these 
sanctioned patterns of behaviour are generally regarded as 
lapses or faults open to criticism. Where there are such 
rules, not only is criticism in fact made, but deviation from 
the standard imposed by the abstract category is generally 
accepted as a good reason for making it. The external aspect 
of rules can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from mere 
habitual behaviour. But there is a critical difference in 
principle between the external aspect of rules and mere habits: 
The external aspect of rules has something standing "behind" 
it, as it were, which a mere social habit does not have. What 
it has behind it is its collective representation as a category 
of behaviour to be recognized learned and taught and 
followed by members of the group. It is precisely this element 
that Wittgenstein's analysis leaves out of the picture, the 
element that some commentators have loosely referred to as "the 
normative". 
A mere social habit or practice, taken by itself, cannot 
provide the external or public check that Wittgenstein sought 
in vain as the objective ground of meaning and knowledge, 
-86-
includinq mathematical knowledqe. This is because, if a rule 
has no internal aspect, as Wittqenstein imaqined, there can be 
nothinq to measure actual behaviour aqainst and so no criterion 
for the correct application of critical behaviour in cases of 
putative deviation from the normal course. Overt sanctioninq 
behaviour constitutes one part of the external aspect of rules. 
It is a necessary condition for the existence of bindinq rules 
in the sense that, if there were no sanctioninq behaviour, 
there could be no rules, for we should have no way of learninq 
and teachinq the abstract cateqories of behaviour they impose 
and of which, in part, they consist. In one sense, rules are 
created by the actual critical behaviour of the qroup, which 
is after all a form of observable behaviour, but it would be 
a mistake to suppose from this, as Wittqenstein appears to 
suppose, that the public response is itself a sufficient 
condition for the existence of bindinq rules and objective 
normative constraint. By adoptinq what might be called an 
"outsider's" perspective of rules, Wittqenstein left out of his 
account of the basis of qroup life the way that members view 
their own reqular (and irregular) behaviour. Thus it miqh t 
have seemed plausible (but is, in fact, false) to suppose that 
the critical response of the community was a sufficient 
condition for the existence of rules. I cannot say if this 
error was the error that allowed Wittgenstein to identify rules 
with habits, but it seems likely that his doctrinaire rejection 
of abstract phenomena was the real cause of his identification 
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of rules with habits. 
Wittgenstein's vision of social rules was obscured by a partial 
blindness. Why have so many of his commentators failed to 
recognize this defect and to attempt to correct it? One reason 
may be that they, too, have shared Wittgenstein's almost 
irrational repungance for abstract phenomena. Most of his 
critics seem to have been internal critics, those who have 
accepted as a basic ground rule of analysis the empiricist 
dogma, accepted by Wittgenstein, that only observable sensibles 
are real. Since abstract phenomena cannot be observed but 
concrete particulars can, they seem to have reasoned, the 
latter are real and the former are not, and all statements 
about the behaviour of abstract groups, and all use of abstract 
concepts to describe the behaviour of individuals, can 
ultimately be reduced to statements about the feelings, 
beliefs, or dispositions of individuals, for what else is 
there? Wittgenstein's doctrine of family resemblances, which 
as been so widely discussed and misunderstood, was in fact 
nothing less than an all-out frontal attack on abstract 
phenomena. Bis remarks on rules and rule following vacillate 
between collateral attacks on essences and genuine statements 
of perplexity at the results of his own theorizing activities. 
I venture to suggest that the main thrust of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy, his later work, was the denial of abstract 
phenomena. Bis mission, as he saw it, was to forever destroy 
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this myth. But this was bound to lead him into trouble, for 
as Durkheim once remarked, "Man is dual". By this, Durkheim 
was not alluding, in a Cartesian manner, to the duality of mind 
and body but rather to the duality of concreteness and 
abstractness which is the condition of humankind. We live in 
two worlds: a world of abstractions and categories and a world 
of concrete phenomena, of material bodies and mental events. 
These two worlds together constitute society and make it a 
possibility and indeed a necessity for life as we know it. 
Wittgenstein recognized, rightly, that speech and communication 
behaviour could only be understood by seeing how these 
phenomena were part of the "stream of like and thought" and how 
they fitted into "patterns of activity" in the course of 
"purposeful and shared activity". But in speaking of these 
phenomena as mere "activities", "forms of life", or "the 
given", he omitted a crucial dimension of social life from his 
theorizing activity. Most people will agree that language and 
speech are considerably more than mere activities. If language 
and theorizing were "mere" activities, reflecting nothing other 
than their own brute existence as sounds or marks on paper and 
pointing to nothing beyond themselves, they would amount to no 
more than what Mead called a "conversation of gestures" of the 
kind that ensues between infrahuman creatures that have not 
attained to the level of "symbolic" interaction. The behaviour 
of two wild dogs eyeing each other is a case in point: The 
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sort of "conversation" of power that precedes actual physical 
struggle for dominance fits into a stimulus-response paradigm 
of animal psychology that is ill equipped to explain or make 
sense of abstract, theorizing activity. Is this the sort of 
paradigm that Wittgenstein's theorizing presupposes? Bloor has 
in fact been so impressed with this aspect of Wittgenstein's 
empiricist approach that he has attempted to develop and push 
these ideas to their limits by using the idiom of stimulus-
response theory . The Skinnerian counterpart of Wittgenstein's 
public criterion of custom is found, Bloor says, in the notion 
of a reinforcement schedule. 
Echoing Pavlov, Bloor says that an organism learns its 
behaviour by a system of "external" checks and reinforcements. 
Bloor really is one of Wittgenstein's most radical expositors. 
Be seems quite faithful to Wittgenstein's position: Bis attempt 
to explain the possibility of human thought, speech, and action 
from within the Skinnerian framework shows just how remote the 
theories of Durkheim and Mead really are from those of 
Wittgenstein. It is only a pity that Bloor fails to see that 
this is so. Bis Skinnerian account leads him to want to argue 
that "observable behaviour" provides our "ultimate criterion" 
of meaning and understanding. But Bloor forgets to ask: 
"observable" to whom?" It is trite sociology that patterns of 
behaviour (the external aspect of rules) become observable 
through participant observation and often remain unnoticed or 
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indeed invisible when viewed throuqh the eyes of outsiders who 
lack insiders' knowledqe of the holistic concepts (or 
constitutive rules) that constitute and define the actions and 
patterns in question. As Searle has said, it is possible that 
men miqht line up and qo throuqh the same physical movements 
as are qone throuqh by two teams at a football qame, but if 
there were no rules of football, that is, no antecedently 
existinq game of football, there is no sense in which their 
behaviour could be described as playing football. For the 
anthropoloqist or sociologist of knowledge, for whom knowledge 
is "distributed", there is recognized to be many points of view 
and many group perspectives, and what is "externally 
observable" to a member of one group may not be so to a member 
of another. The "ultimate criterion" for understanding the 
basis of human social life is the insider's perspective, and 
this is something that individuals learn to see as they become 
socialized into the multifarious groups to which they belong. 
Indeed, we often cannot "see" the patterns of behaviour that 
constitute the external aspect of rules until we have acquired 
an insider's knowledge of social structure, and this is a form 
of knowledge by acquaintance and not merely knowledge by 
description, it involves the insider's apprehension of an 
abstract, preexisting system of rules or abstract categories. 
This is not to say that everything in a practice or an 
institution will be transparent to participants. Often, what 
a participant "knows" will come down to know-how that may just 
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be "habits" that enab:Le peop:Le to carry on confident:Ly (as 
peop:Le hand:Le the grammatica:L intricacies of their native 
:Languages before they are exposed to grammatica:L theory) . But 
behind these habits, in the case of speech behaviour, it is the 
system of abstract co:L:Lective representations that we ca:L:L 
:Language that makes such speech behaviour possib:Le and 
inte:L:Ligib:Le. Because Wittgenstein denies the existence of any 
such "preexisting" system he is :Led to the hope:Less view that 
the meaning of a word is inextricab:Le from the context in which 
it is origina:L:Ly :Learned. 
Wittgenstein's rejection of abstract phenomena :Led him to the 
view that there is nothing that can be treated as a standard 
of behaviour, inc:Luding categorizing behaviour, and so nothing 
in that behaviour which manifests the internal- point of view 
characteristic of the acceptance of ru:Les. But to argue in 
this way impa:Les us on the horns of a fa:Lse di:Lemma: either 
ru:Les are what they might be in a forma:List's P:Latonic heaven -
a view that Wittgenstein is at pains to reject - or there are 
no ru:Les at a:L:L. The first part of Wittgenstein's wide:Ly 
discussed section 201 of the Phi:Losophica:L Investigations is a 
case in point: No matter what interpretation we give to section 
201, its argument manque cannot be sustained. Wittgenstein's 
so-ca:L:Led sceptical- paradox, whether read in the original- or 
given a Kripkean g:Loss, is just the sort of resu:Lt one wou:Ld 
expect if there is no such thing as a zu:Le. One seazches in 
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vain in Kripke's work for an adequate conception of rules. Be 
does not embrace Wittgenstein's rule anti-realism outright, but 
it seems clear there is no place in his thinking for the 
abstract, internal dimension of rules. 
The refusal to accept or to see that abstract phenomena have 
a reality ~ generis is often based on the supposed obscurity 
of this claim itself. Wittgenstein is the best-known modern 
example that can be cited of an empiricist philosopher who 
regarded all such talk of abstract phenomena as a mistake, or 
as mystification or obfuscation. That was his very foundation, 
a foundation that is wholly endorsed by almost all of 
analytical philosophy today. The deep confusion that this view 
promotes, ~owever, is only too evident from Wittgenstein's 
perplexed and cryptic jottings. Wittgenstein's rejection of 
abstract phenpmena left him with nothing to fall back on save 
his own fleeting and ephemeral sensations, feelings, and 
observations of the behaviour of others. Ayer seems right in 
saying that Wittgenstein's position is untenable because it 
invol.ves a "behaviouristic account of the experience of others 
and a mentalistic account of one's own" (1986: 79) . Such 
accounts l.eave no room for the existence of abstract social 
phenomena. I realize that this line of reasoning will strike 
most Wittgensteinians as backwards. The view I have been 
expressing, they will say, "is precisely what Wittgenstein was 
trying to get away from. It is mistaken". But what sort of 
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view did he put in its pl.ace? Most certainl.y it was not a 
view that coul.d expl.ain how human social. l.ife is possibl.e. 
Wittgenstein is l.eft with the same probl.em of the 1st Critigue. 
He is not abl.e to account for the possibil.ity of l.anguage. 
Searl.e argues that "we l.ive in one worl.d". I have al.ready 
given reasons for thinking that we l.ive in two worlds. I 
have al.so mentioned in passing that the view I am adopting is 
Durkheim's view that "man is dual.". The reason for this 
dual.ity is the dual.ity of the worl.ds we l.ive in. I now want 
to expl.ore this dual.ity in terms of Hart's rul.e theory. 
Hart's theory of rul.es gives us a tool. for anal.yzing and 
understanding this dual.ity. We have al.ready seen how Hart's 
model. differs from the one I have attributed to Wittgenstein 
or at l.east Bl.oor's Wittgenstein. Now we want to expl.ore this 
model. further to see how it l.inks up with Popper's three worl.ds 
and with Durkheim's theory of social. facts. 
We can begin by formal.izing Hart's model. of rul.es in the 
fol.l.owing way: 
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1 External aspect - "patterns of behaviour" 
2(a) Internal Aspect - "Critical Reflective Attitude" (to) 
2(b) Internal Aspect - "patterns of behaviour" (taken as a) 
2 ~c) Internal Aspect - "common standard" 
We can now make the following observations: 
1 and 2(b) (c) are mediated by 2(a) 
There are internal relations between elements in the system 
of 2 ( c) 
There are internal relations between the elements in 
2 (b) (c) and 1 
2(a) is a reflective, psychic (or psychological) element 
2(b) (c) are abstracta. 
1 are concreta or brute facts 
2(b) (c) are representations or constructs of 1 "under an 
aspect" 
We can amplify this model by considering Popper's (1972) 3 
Worlds. Although this scheme has come in for criticism on the 
grounds that it is simplistic and ontologically extravagant, I 
think it provides us with a more comprehensive way of looking 
at social reality. 
-95-
Accordinq to Popper's scheme, World I is the world of physical 
objects and states. World I is concrete. World 2 is the 
world of self-consciousness and subjective psycholoqical or 
mental phenomena. World 3 is the world of objective knowledqe, 
it is the abstract world of culture and collective 
representations. 
Worlds 1, 2 and 3 are accordinq to Popper related in the 
followinq way: 
1 
Worlds 1 and 3 are mediated by world 2. World 3 consists of 
a cultural heritaqe coded on material substrates. There are 
internal relations between worlds 1 and 3, or in other words, 
"behavioural correlates of meaninq". World 3 presupposes the 
existence of both worlds 1 and 2, but cannot be "reduced" to 
either of the two or both. There are internal relations 
between the elements in World 3 as well. These relations 
consist in conceptual and loqical relations. World 3 is 
abstract when considered analytically. But since it is tied 
to World l by internal relations the elements in World 3 are 
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both abstract and concrete, or "dual". When Durkheim said that 
"man is dual" he was saying that we live in World 3 in 
addition to World 1. World 1 is concrete, consisting of brute 
facts and includes Searle's mechanism. World 2 is the world 
of judgement, of Bart's critical reflective attitude. Bart's 
2(a) links Worlds 1 and 3 together and provides the basis for 
internal relations between them. Following a rule is not 
merely a World 1 process. 
According to Searle we live in just one world. Be wan ts us to 
believe that Worlds 2 and 3 are basically World 1 phenomena. 
Wittgenstein thinks that we live in Worlds 1 and 2 only. Be 
rejected the existence of abstract phenomena. Bart's common 
standards, 2(c), are collective representations. World 2 
overlaps with World 3. Individual experience is both 
collective and individual. Worlds 1 and 2 also overlap. 
People live in a world of brute facts. Behavioural correlates 
of meaning (or "internal" relations) exist between Bart's 1 and 
2 (b) . On Popper's model the direction of causal influence 
comes from both Worlds 1 and 3. 
According to Searle' s model the "mechanism" (itself a World 1 
phenomenon) is determined to act and react causally by elements 
in Worlds 1. Everything that is ultimately exists in World 1. 
Thus, "we live in one world". Durkheim argued that we live in 
two worlds. In Popper's model, the individual (in World 2) 
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media tes between Worlds 1 and 3. World 1 is the world of 
"objective physical reality", and World 3 is the world of 
"objective knowledge". Bart and Durkheim would both accept 
such a model. They both argue that there are internal 
relations between Worlds 1 and 3. World 2 is the Reality 
Constructor. The Reality Constructor is causally influenced by 
both Worlds 1 and 3, but it also has some determinative force 
on these worlds. According to this model the actor is not 
"caused" to act, but phenomena in Worlds 1 and 3 "give cause" 
for action. This is not to deny that, insofar as the actor is 
in his body the actor is also in a causal nexus. Nor is it 
to deny that much of the actor's behaviour is motorized. But 
it leaves open the possibility of freedom to act and choose. 
Although World 3 exerts a constant and indeed a crushing 
influence on the individual, the possibility exists that the 
individual is still at liberty to act independently of reasons 
"for" acting. This three worlds system does not deny brute 
fact realism but it denies that Worlds 2 and 3 can be reduced 
to brute facts. And it insists that World 3 encompasses the 
"intelligible" aspect of World 1 phenomena. 
The case I have been attempting to present has been made to 
depend upon the existence of what I have called "abstract 
phenomena". What are they? This is indeed the key question 
to be asked, for it is precisely at this point that 
Wittgensteinian philosophers will be inclined to interdict: 
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"But Wittgenstein destroyed that notion long ago". :tt is true 
that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is generally, if 
obscurely, regarded as an attack on Platonic essences. Bloor 
calls these "strange entities" and says of their advocates that 
"all they do is stress that they are different, more basic, and 
never change"(1983:50). Be then lapses back to Wittgenstein's 
solution to the problem of abstract phenomena: "if you talk 
about essences ... you are merely noting a convention" 
(1983: 50) . But is this really any sort of solution at all? 
Bloor makes it into a problem: he accepts that mathematics and 
logic are "social", or "conventional", and just because they 
are social he wants to say that there can be variation in 
logic and mathematics just as there is variation in social 
structures in different cultures and in different times. Bloor 
traces this relativistic sociologism back to what he calls 
Wittgenstein's "sociologically orientated" Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, and concludes that "it is not 
necessary" to postulate any "vague mathematical reality" once 
we realize that mathematics is but social. There are, however, 
a number of serious mistakes in Bloor's analysis of mathematics 
and logic as social which render his overall approach 
inadequate. The first is that of thinking that "the social" 
can be defined in terms of its external aspect alone. 
Wittgenstein has already been criticized on this ground, the 
ground that he takes no cognizance of the internal aspect of 
rules, and this criticism extends easily to Bloor's attempt to 
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push Wittgenstein's externalist analysis of rules to its 
Skinnerian limits. A second mistake results from Bloor's 
failure to distinguish social phenomena that are vague and 
diffuse from those that are determinate and specific. In a 
sense this is related to his third mistake: the failure to 
distinguish social phenomena that are local and temporal from 
those that are general and basic to the human condition. The 
relativism that he extracts from his sociologism is based on 
a faulty premise: that because there is variation in most 
social phenomena, there is no reason to suppose that there is 
not fluctuation in all social phenomena. What Bloor fails to 
realize is that while some social phenomena are indeed fleeting 
and ephemeral, (eg., fads, fashions) there are others that are 
not so, and that some of these are so basic and unchanging to 
the human condition as to amount to the very conditions of 
human social life itself. I will have more to say about this 
when I turn to Durkheim's sociologism, which, as it turns out, 
is radically different and considerably more sophisticated than 
the version of it that Bloor attributes to Wittgenstein. 
-100-
CHAPTER SIX: DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGISM 
Wittgenstein's sociologism was an attempt to get around the 
tendency, noticed in Frege, to see ma thema ti cal and logical 
concepts and relations as pure and detached from material 
objects and from the concrete field of experience. Bloor notes 
that Frege' s tendency to "Platonize" numbers creates a gulf 
between mathematics and concrete reality. There is truth in 
this. However, if we view arithmetic and logic as social 
phenomena with two aspects, as with Hart's Durkheimian model of 
social rules, this gulf can be closed, and a web of internal 
relations established between configurations of elements in 
nature and abstract social patterns, or unities of meaning. 
Mill's theory of arithmetic, for example, is an empirical 
theory about the purely external dimension of arithmetic, but 
arithmetic also has an internal dimension which is abstract and 
not merely concrete. Once we realize this, any attempt to save 
Mill's theory from the onslaughts of Frege can be seen as or 
perhaps made into part of a larger project. The 
Wittgensteinian effort to explore and develop aspects of the 
external dimension of mathematics can be used as part of a more 
encompassing approach which recognizes the dual nature of 
social phenomena and attempts to work out their 
interconnections. I realize that this must sound impossibly 
conjectural and programmatic, especially when it is based upon 
such a slender theoretical formulation, but in what follows I 
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will attempt to sketch a view of a way in which Platonic or 
Fregean forms might be "sociologized". In so doing, I will, 
in the main, be following the lead of Durkheim, whose theory 
seems badly in need of exposition. Few philosophers seem to 
understand its important central tenets: this is shown by the 
fact that the identification of Wittgenstein and Durkheim as 
belonging to the same sociological tradition has been allowed 
to stand without challenge, when it is so badly mistaken. 
It is perhaps best to let Durkheim speak for himself, since his 
views seem to be so widely misunderstood. In what follows I 
will do just that, culling my material from his important yet 
widely ignored essay "Individual and Collective Representations" 
(1974) . Durkheim there distinguished "individual 
representations", or ideas in the mind, from "collective 
representations", which he regarded as abstract and social in 
nature. He argued that the latter, although abstract, did not 
"hang in the air" as he thinks Platonists have supposed, but 
that they had a "definite substratum". This substratum is "the 
mass of associated individuals. The system which they form by 
uniting together, which varies according to their geographical 
disposition and the nature and number of their channels of 
communication" (1974: 24) . With regard to the relationship 
between abstract collective phenomena and their substratum, 
Durkheim stated that ."while maintaining an intimate relation 
with their substratum" collective representations are "to a 
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certain extent independent of it" (1974: 23) . Nevertheless, 
"their autonomy can only be a relative one; and there is no 
realm of nature that is not bound to others". "No thing could 
be more absurd", he said, "than to elevate them into a sort of 
absolute, derived from nothing and unattached to the rest of 
the universe" (1974: 23) 
To enforce his point that abstract collective representations 
cannot be reduced to their substratum, Durkheim draws an 
analogy between "the relationship which unites the social 
substratum and social life" and "that which undeniably exists 
between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of 
individuals"(1974:24). Be believes that if he can show the 
absurdity of reducing the mind to the brain (and the brain to 
its chemical elements), he will be able to show the 
irreducibility of abstract social phenomena to their 
behavioural or mental counterparts. Bis argument runs as 
follows: "the condition of the brain affects all intellectual. 
phenomena and is the immediate cause of some of them (pure 
sensation) But on the other hand, representational life is 
not inherent in the intrinsic nature of nervous matter, since 
in part it exists by its own force and has its own peculiar 
manner of being .... A representation is not simply an aspect 
of the condition of a neural element at the particular moment 
it takes pJ.ace, since it persists after the condition has 
passed, and since the relations of representations are 
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different in nature from those underlying the neural elements" 
(1974:25). "If there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that 
individual representations, produced by the action and reaction 
between neural elements, are not inherent in these elements, 
there is nothing surprising in the fact that collective 
representations, produced by the action and reaction between 
individual minds that form society, do not derive directly from 
the latter and consequently surpass them" (1974:26). Be 
continues with this analogy: "each mental condition is, as 
regards neural cells, in the same condition of relative 
independence as social phenomena are in relation to individual 
people" (1974: 28) . There is, he says, "no need to conceive of 
a soul separated from its body maintaining in some ideal milieu 
a dreamy or solitary existence .... The soul is in the world 
and its life is involved with the life of things" (1974: 28). 
But, he says, even though all our "though ts" are "in the 
brain", they "cannot be rigidly localized or situated at 
definite points". This diffusion or ubiquity, he says, "is 
sufficient proof that they constitute a new 
phenomenon ... (1974:28-29). In order that this diffusion can 
exist, their composition must be different from that of the 
cerebral mass, and consequently must have a different manner of 
being which is special to them" (1974: 29). Be thus concludes 
his argument: "those then, who accuse us of leaving social life 
in the air because we refuse to reduce it to the individual 
mind have not, perhaps, recognized all of the consequences of 
-104-
their objection .... If it were justified it would apply just 
as well to the relations between mind and brain, for in order 
to be logical they must reduce the mind to the brain. But 
then ... following the same principle ... one would be bound to 
say that the properties of life consist in particles of oxygen, 
hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen, which compose the living 
protoplasm, since it contains nothing beyond those particular 
minerals just as society contains nothing more than 
individuals. In fact, individualistic sociology is only 
applying the old principles of materialistic metaphysics to 
social life" (1974:30). 
So here we have the core of Durkheim's social metaphysics in 
his own words. He rejects the Platonic vision of a heavenly 
realm of abstract phenomena unattached to any sort of material 
or psychic substratum. At the same time, he denies that 
abstract social phenomena can be "reduced" to either mental or 
physical phenomena. He characterizes abstract social phenomena 
as having a reality ~ generis. In this way it may be said 
that he "sociologizes" Platonic and Fregean forms. This comes 
out most clearly when considering other aspects of Durkheim's 
theory. There are a number of points which Durkheim makes 
about collective representations which are of utmost 
importance. He often refers to them as social facts. He 
maintains that they continue to exist in themselves without 
their existence being perpetually dependent upon the 
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disposition of any one concrete mind. Be says, contentiously, 
that collective representations have the power of reacting 
directly upon each other and to combine according to their own 
laws. They are, he says, (as we saw) external to individuals. 
Be suggests, very importantly, that abstract social phenomena 
come in varying degrees of specificity and determinateness. 
Phenomena such as numbers, elements of logic, or crystallized 
law can be cited as examples of the most determinate of all 
the social forms. Social currents and movements, vague 
political and ideological notions, on the other hand, are some 
of the most indeterminate and diffuse. Be also recognizes that 
some social phenomena are general to all of humankind whereas 
others are specific to local groups. Some of the former are 
actually general enough to be called "constitutive of" human 
social life. The introduction of rules of inference and the 
associated vocabulary of "not", "implies", "therefore", "follows 
from", "and", "or", "if ... then", and so on are cases in point. 
These social phenomena allow us to calculate and to think. 
Then there is the normative vocabulary of rules in general, 
consisting of "ought", "must", "should", "right" and "wrong", 
and so on which c~nstitutes the actual glue of social life. 
In his Primitive Classification Durkheim suggests that 
arithmetic and counting behaviour have an elementary basis in 
group perception, and especially in perceptions of "us" and 
"them". Having learnt to use "the same" and "different" in 
this way, through classifying ourselves and others, we extend 
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this abstract knowledge to other things in the natural and 
social environment. In this way we learn to sort and group 
and to count and it is on the basis of this that we learn to 
calculate in other ways. These are social skills. They may 
be said to constitute the step from the pre-social to the 
social world. In this way individuals become "part of" 
society, they preserve and perpetuate it while at the same time 
being held in check by it, as the grid of collective 
representations forces itself upon them through interaction 
with the collectivity. Some social phenomena are indeed 
specific to certain cultures, such as systems of signs or 
currency which are local and temporary phenomena which vary 
from one culture to another and from time to time. But there 
are others of a more basic and durable nature, such as the 
institutions of arithmetic and logic. They can hardly be 
called "arbitrary" merely because they are social 
constructions. They have objective parameters which set their 
bounds, such as human physiology, the structure of the physical 
universe, what may be called the "furniture" of the human mind 
and, according to Durkheim, laws or principles of their own 
association. They are so basic that they can be said to be 
"timeless" and unchanging to the human condition. Because they 
constitute the foundations, upon which are built the edifices, 
of meaning, they have a "giveness" which seems quite atemporal 
just because we could not imagine what it might be like without 
them, or if they were different than we know them to be. 
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I have just been discussinq the social foundations of human 
knowledqe. By callinq them "social" I am indicatinq a movement 
toward socioloqical idealism. What would it be like to 
"socioloqize" the Kantian cateqories of the understandinq? 
This is, in fact, exactly what Durkheim has suqgested we do. 
Be was not alone. There were suqqestions from some neo-
Kantians alonq precisely these lines: some writers, like 
Cassirer and C.I. Lewis, reportedly thouqht that the cateqories 
were not fixed by nature or by the nature of our psycholoqical 
faculties, but were capable of historical and cultural 
variation - althouqh it is unclear just how far they miqht have 
been prepared to go in this direction. Perhaps, like Bloor and 
Wittqenstein, they would have been prepared to qo "all the way" 
if pressed. But Durkheim would most certainly have rejected 
this, for reasons that have just been canvassed. A related 
question that miqht be raised, in this connection, is the 
extent to which a philosopher's views can be "socioloqized" as 
opposed to beinq reqarded as "proto-socioloqical". My view is 
that a writer's theories are proto-socioloqical if there is a 
hint, even a trace, that he or she would have reqarded the 
basic buildinq blocks of knowledqe as "social", no matter how 
sliqht the appreciation of such a view miqht have been. 
is no indication that I am aware of in the 1st Critique 
There 
that 
would suqqest that Kant reqarded his cateqories as social 
constructions, althouqh his talk of requlative and constitutive 
principles is suqqestive. Be attempted to qround the 
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distinction between experience and thought in different 
faculties of the mind, the sensibility and the understanding. 
But he recognized the difference between the psychological 
faculty of judgement, and the forms of judgement which provided 
for the unity of apperception, and regarded the latter as 
transcendental. Bis unity of apperception would have been 
regarded as social by Durkheim, in the same way that abstract 
collective representations are so: they transcend individual 
experience and pre-exist individual consciousness of them. 
Moreover, the particular contents of experience were recognized 
by Kant as having some general character, and this generality 
is explained by some modern commentators in terms of "rules" 
and "rules for the application of rules" which are said to 
constitute the empirical schematism and the categories of the 
understanding respectively. 
To what extent can Frege and Plato be sociologized? Or were 
they proto-sociological thinkers? There are indications that 
Frege regarded his "concepts of reason" as cultural artefacts 
even though he characterized them as "timeless". Be wrote, in 
the context of a discussion of the distinction between "ideas" 
in the minds of individuals and the objective "sense" of a 
sign, that mankind "has a store of thoughts which is 
transmitted from one generation to another". Did Frege(l984: 
368) mean to suggest that his concepts of reason, including 
numbers (which he often characterized as "objects") , were part 
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of the storehouse of social forms, or would he have put them 
in another category altogether, one that, as Bloor complains, 
has nothing to do with the social and which he understood but 
poorly? The answer is not clear. Bloor's deflationary 
sociologism aimed to "demystify" Frege's Platonism by 
construing numbers in terms of their purely external aspect 
alone, but what would it be like to attempt to "sociologize" 
Platonic and Fregean forms as part of a Durkheimian social 
epistemology? What would this amount to? Here ' the f OCUS 
would be on analogies that can be drawn between forms as social 
categories or collective representations, and Plato's doctrine 
of "participation" and the actual group participation that 
imposes the collective grid upon the individual. Patterson has 
said of Plato's doctrine of participation that it is 
impenetrable just because of the primitiveness of the notion 
itself, yet he gives an interpretation of Plato's metaphysics 
that encourages us to see it proto-sociologically: in speaking 
of concepts that constitute and define society and social 
structures, he notes that these phenomena are "separated from" 
the individuals who "participate" in them. Be gives examples 
of roles that it would be difficult if not impossible to reduce 
to the thoughts, feelings, or dispositions of individuals. Be 
recognizes that society and societal phenomena are "abstract" 
and says they are "independent of the people ... " who 
participate in them as group members. Be then offers the 
suggestion that this description seems to "Platonize" social 
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phenomena. But would it not be better to say that such a 
description "sociologizes" Plato's original conception of them? 
This is of course highly speculative, but it is interestingly 
so: the idea has been to give some indication of what it might 
be like to theorize about the problems of philosophy from a 
Durkheimian perspective. 
Even though Durkheim's critique of Platonism seems decisive, he 
is still referred to as a "social Platonist" or even a 
"Platonist" by some of his commentators. There is a simp1e 
explanation for this: it is that Durkheim's social metaphysics 
contains a definite Platonic element, namely the "abstractness" 
of social phenomena and their capacity, which is sometimes 
fully realised, of assuming highly determinate "forms" or 
"essences" which can be - and are - used deductively in the 
manner of a calculus by human beings. I have already been 
through these arguments and there is no use in repeating them, 
but it is worth mentioning that these social forms constitute 
a transcendental reality closed to our physical senses but 
nonetheless accessib1e by other means. Their method of 
apprehension, the manner in which they are collectively brought 
into being and persist, and the nature of the constraint they 
exercise upon us at all levels - from the most microscopic to 
the most macroscopic all constitute worthy topics of 
investigation. For this, if for no other reason, Durkheim's 
social Platonism is worth exploring further. It also raises 
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some interesting theoretical problems, such as those that have 
already been alluded to. Most importantly, perhaps, Durkheim's 
sociologism establishes a framework for exploring the social 
foundations of ~ priori knowledge. His attempts to sociologize 
the categories of the understanding, his social theory of 
arithmetic and logic, and his overall concern with the problems 
of universal and necessary knowledge, give ample proof of this. 
Let us imagine a spectrum of theories now with Durkheim's 
sociologism counterpoised between the two polar opposites of 
relativism and dogmatic absolutism. At one end of the spectrum 
we have something that looks like a version of subjective 
idealism or what may be called "social Berkeleyism". This is 
a constructivist theory of reality not unlike the relativistic 
sociologism of Wittgenstein and Bloor: when it comes to the 
social world, though not necessarily the physical world, most 
relativist-constructivist theorists today would accept Bishop 
Berkeley's formulation that "to be is to be perceived". 
Beauty, truth and goodness, law history and art, status, role 
and self, and even logic and arithmetic, are ephemeral social 
constructions, according to them. There is no distinction to 
be made between appearances and reality, they say, because 
reality just is a collective appearance, or maya. 
Totally opposed to this relativism, at the other end of the 
spectrum, is something that may be called "dogmatic Platonism", 
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or perhaps "vulgar Platonism", but in any case something that 
postulates a self-subsistent or independent realm of eternal, 
unchanging, abstract reality, but goes little further than this 
by way of attempting to explain the nature or the character of 
this reality. Could these two extreme theories, situated at 
either end of our imaginary spectrum, be the "false dichotomy" 
supposed by Dummett (1959:447) to exist in the philosophy of 
mathematics and to be eliminable by the interposition of some 
middle theory which he leaves unnamed? If so, then that theory 
can now be named: it is social realism or social Platonism or, 
if we like to think in terms of "sociologisms" it is Durkheim's 
sociologism. Wittgenstein's sociologism has been exposed as a 
species of psychologism and branded as social Berkeleyism. The 
theories of Frege, Plato, and Kant have been given proto- or 
a-sociological interpretations. We can see then that there are 
any number of theories that can be spread across the spectrum 
described, but there are certain fixed points with reference to 
which these theories can be given their precise location on it. 
There are three such points of reference and they are 
represented by the three views that I have been discussing. 
Do these three views represent "stages" in the development of 
philosophical thought? A speculative neo-Kantian might say so. 
Kant thought there were cycles in the history of philosophy and 
he identified three stages through which all philosophy must 
pass: (i) dogmatic metaphysics, and, as a reaction against 
this, (ii) acid scepticism, and finally (iii) the stage of pure 
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reason, which is that of "examination, not of the facts of 
reason, but of reason itself, in the whole extent of its 
powers, and as regards its aptitude for pure a priori 
knowledge". Since we are all agreed that reason is, at least 
in part, social and not merely psychological, does Hegel' s 
theory now take the place that Kant's once took between radical 
scepticism and dogmatic rationalism? A Durkheimian might say 
"yes". For others the answer will not be so clear, but one 
thing that is certain is that Durkheim's sociologism is quite 
unlike that of Wittgenstein's and presents a radically 
different way of viewing social facts. We should take this 
into account: that there are two sociologisms, one is an 
empiricism that spells the end of philosophy and the other is 
an idealism that heralds a new beginning. That is why 
sociologism is pivotal, because it stands at the centre of a 
fork in the road. It is like a signpost that points in two 
directions. It increases our comprehension of the concept of a 
social fact, and allows us to trace out leitfaden between 
sociology and philosophy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY - AN APPLICATION OF 
THE MODEL 
Let us now apply the social fact model developed so far to one of the 
most basic specialty sciences in the Geisteswissenschaften - leqal 
anthropoloqy. Leqal anthropoloqy is basic because it is simple, and 
the questions it raises are also basic and simple. If the social 
fact model I have been developinq has any applicability at all - and 
this must ultimately be the test of any model - we should be able to 
see it here. 
We already know that social facts have an inside and an outside, and 
that these are tied toqether by internal relations. If customary 
law, which is the basic subject-matter of leqal anthropoloqy, is a 
social fact, then it must also have an inside and an outside, tied 
toqether by conceptual connections. In this chapter I will explain 
how this aspect of the model of social facts developed here can be 
used to: 
i) clarify the concepts of "custom" and "law" in leqal 
anthropoloqy 
ii) mount a critique of behaviourism in leqal anthropoloqy, and 
iii) defeat rule-scepticism in leqal anthropoloqy. 
I will do this by explaininq how the model of social facts can be 
used to resolve, or at least clarify, one of leqal anthropoloqy's 
most basic methodoloqical problems. This miqht seem like a detour, 
and it miqht be arqued that in a work of this brevity and compass 
there is no time for detours. But it is not entirely a detour, 
-115-
because in applying the model I will develop and extend it. And in 
any case, the attempt to show the efficacy of a theoretical model by 
applying it to concrete problems in a special science can hard1y be 
called a waste of time. The detour might be regarded as a way of 
running a quick "reality check" on the model developed here. 
In the Cheyenne WAY jurist Karl Llewellyn and anthropologist E. 
Adamson Boebel collaborated in outlining a theory of investigating 
customary law which has since become standard reading as part of an 
introduction to the subject. In a chapter titled "A theory of 
investigation" they sketched three methods of investigating what 
Llewellyn had termed the "law stuff" of a culture. The first method 
was termed "ideological" and went to "rules" which were conceived to 
be "ideal patterns, right ways against which the real action is to 
be measured". The second method was "descriptive" and was said to 
deal with practice and to explore the patterns according to which 
behaviour actually occurs. The third method of investigating 
preliterate or unwritten "law" was called the "trouble case method" 
and was a search for instances of "hitch, dispute, grievance, 
trouble" and an enquiry what the trouble was and what was done about 
it. The authors, as is now well-known, themselves adopted the 
trouble case method in their research on the law of the Cheyenne 
Indians in Wyoming, and since then a generation of legal 
anthropologists have adopted, or adapted, the trouble case method as 
well. Indeed, focus on disputes and dispute institutions seems to 
have displaced a focus on "law" for many researchers, and thus the 
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expressions "legal" and "anthropology" may seem dubiously appropriate 
in many cases. 
The reason given by Llewellyn and Hoebel for preferring the exclusive 
use of the trouble case method was that the authors found it 
"convenient to treat as 'law' for a culture that 'norm' which will 
be recoqnized as proper to prevail in the pinch". What went unstated 
are the jurisprudential underpinnings of the trouble case method 
which were brought in through the back door by Llewellyn's theory of 
"legal realism", a central principle of which was that judicial 
decisions are the only "sources" of law. Without spending time on 
the shortcomings of this jurisprudential doqma here, or commenting 
on the use of such doqmas as quides for empirical research on legal 
phenomena, we need only note that if judicial decisions or trouble 
cases were the only source of law we should have no need at all for 
the "ideological" and "descriptive" methods outlined by Llewellyn and 
Hoebel. But it is incontrovertible that judicial decisions are not 
the only sources of law, and that "custom" itself can be a source of 
law and legal obligation. 
If we accept custom as a source of law and legal obligation, in 
addition to judicial decisions, it seems clear that we should also 
look again at the two methods of investigation discarded in The 
Cheyenne Way and attempt to see how all three methods might be 
comprehensively em.ployed. But if we do hark back to methods of legal 
research which have their foci on rules of law having their sources 
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outside of the contest of litiqation or dispute, which method should 
we revert to in the case of conflictinq results when each method is 
used independently of the others. And how miqht we qo about the job 
of inteqratinq or unifyinq these three methods? I will suqqest that 
these questions are at bottom, questions about the foundations of the 
Geisteswissenschaften. 
So much for qeneralities. Now consider an actual methodoloqical 
problem that confronted an anthropoloqist in the field who used the 
descriptive, ideoloqical and trouble case methods of research. The 
problem is clearly illustrated in a note by Simon Roberts (1971) in 
which he describes the results of his research into the customary law 
in Botswana: 
Durinq the course of investiqatinq the nature of interests 
in arable land held under customary forms of tenue, Roberts 
writes that he asked several senior tribesmen whether 
payment was ever made where fields were transferred from 
one person to another. A11 were emphatic that such 
payments were "aqainst the law", and that they never 
occurred. However, as he had already discovered by 
investiqatinq the actual decisions of the Chief's Court of 
the same qroup, such payments were indeed permitted, 
provided that the land had been cleared for cultivation. 
Puzzled by this discrepancy Roberts focussed his attention 
on the actual practices of the people and discovered that 
it was a common practice for payments to be demanded, even 
where interests in uncleared land were transferred, and 
even thouqh it was common knowledqe that the Chief's Court 
did not recoqnize such payments (Hund, 1974) . 
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Here were three methods if investigation, conforming, in their order 
of appearance in the text, to the ideological, trouble case and 
descriptive methods outlined by Llewellyn and Hoebel. And each 
method produced a different "picture" of law. The methodological 
question is which picture (if any) most accurately represented social 
reality as it was at the time of the investigation. In order to get 
a hold on this slippery question we have to ask questions about the 
nature of "custom" and "customary law". And in order to answer these 
questions we need a theory of social facts. 
What do we mean by saying that custom is a source of law? Should we 
suppose that all custom is law in the way that E.S. Hartland did, 
over half a century ago, in his Primitive Law? Or would this lead 
to absurdity? Hoebel, commenting on Hartland's identification of law 
and custom in his The Law of Primitive HAil arqued that if law were 
to be so identified we should have to say that "patterns of pottery 
making, flint making, tooth filing, toilet training, and all other 
social habits of a people, are law" (1954: 20). What we need to know 
is what distinguishes customs per ~ from customary law. Is there 
any difference, and if so what is it? 
Following Hart, the first thing to notice is that custom is generally 
used, by lawyers and laymen alike, to mean no more than reqular, 
habitual or convergent behaviour. Thus, to say that a group has a 
certain custom is to say no more than that the members, or most of 
them, regularly behave in this or that way. But then what is the 
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difference between the social habits of a group, and the "law" of the 
same group? Here we come to the nerve of the problem, and to resolve 
it we can turn to the model of social facts. 
We already know that a social rule as defined by Bart has an 
"internal aspect" in addition to an external aspect which consists 
in simple, regular behaviour which an observor could record. The 
internal aspect is, according to Bart, sometimes misrepresented as 
a matter of psychological thoughts, feelings and impressions, but 
these are "neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of 
binding rules" (1961: 54). What is necessary is that "there should 
be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour 
which are taken as a common standard" (1961:56). For a group to have 
a social habit it is sufficient that their behaviour be regular and 
convergent. Deviation from the regular course need not be a matter 
for criticism. But where legal rules of customary origin exist 
"deviations are generally regarded as lapses or faults open to 
criticism, and threatened deviations meet with pressure for 
conformity" (1961: 56) . Why? The reason can be traced back to 
Llewellyn and Boebel' s conception of a rule as an "ideal pattern" 
(B(2) and (3)), or "right way" against which the real action A is to 
be measured. So, we measure A against B(2). It is [B(2) (3)] that 
provides the standards against which A is measured. The "standard" 
is only those B(2)'s which are taken A§. B(3). But it is B(l), the 
critical reflective attitude toward B(2), that distinguishes simple 
custom B(2) from customary law B(3). B(l) is the psychic ingredient 
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in customary law, and it is this that distinguishes customary law 
from mere custom, or social practice. This view deviates from 
positivist approaches to legal anthropology, which dispense with the 
need for any "hidden" psycho-social dimension. These approaches 
assess legal life and thought from the Kantian external observor's 
point of view, as a system of behaviour or phenomena alone. Bart 
argues (against such a Kantian methodology) that if the observor 
really does keep to this extreme external point of view, and does not 
thereby give any account of the manner in which members of the group 
who accept the rules view their own intelligible behaviour, his 
descriptions of their life cannot be in terms of rules at all, and 
so not in terms of the rule-dependent notions obligation and duty. 
In a passage that is worth repeating Bart says that: 
his view will be like the view of one who, having observed 
the working of a traffic light in a busy street for some 
time, limits himself to saying that when the light turns 
red there is a high probability that traffic will stop. 
Be treats the light merely as a natural ~ ..tnA.t people 
will behave in certain ways, as clouds are a .:U.gn .tbAt rain 
will come. In so doing he will mi.ss out a whole dimension 
(sic) of the social life of those whom he is watching, 
since for them the red light is not merely a sign that 
others will stop: they look upon it as a signal for them to 
stop, and so a reason for stopping in conformi.ty to rules 
which make stopping when the light is red a standard of 
behaviour and an obligation (1961: 86). 
What the Kantian model, which limi.ts itself to observable 
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regularities of phenomena, cannot reproduce is the way in which rules 
function as criteria from the internal point of view. From this 
point of view group members use these standards as guides to the 
conduct of social life. Such rules give them reasons for acting in 
one way rather than another. This is not just a matter of Verstehen 
suggesting hypotheses about empirical regularities (as Nadel (1957: 
25) once suggested), but rather that the regularities are made 
intelligible by being related to the social meanings which members 
attach to their own and others' behaviour. Reference to the internal 
aspect of rules is required for any analysis of social reality and 
the legal conceptions of obligation and duty, and rights, and until 
its importance is fully grasped we shall be unable to properly 
understand Hegel's conception of an "intelligible" world, existing 
"behind" the Kantian world of appearances. 
The technical name qiven to the internal dimension of rules (of 
customary oriqin) is opinio juris, and is usually defined as a 
conviction that a certain form of conduct is required by customary 
law. Everybody would agree, says Fuller, that "a person, a tribe or 
a nation does not incur an obliqation simply because a repetitive 
pattern can be discerned in his or its actions ... Customary law 
arises out of repetitive actions when and only when such actions are 
motivated by a sense of obligation" (1969: 16). 
Evidence of the existence of opinio juris can come in different ways. 
First, it can come in what appears at first to be simple habitual or 
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reqular (or customary) modes of social behaviour. This would be a 
variant of Verstehen used to suggest hypotheses about empirical 
regularities. A customary rule of law has been held to be based 
necessarily on a "constant and uniform usage", and the method used 
to determine the existence of this usage conforms closely to 
Llewellyn and Boebel's "descriptive" method of investigation. 
Secondly, probes into the normative element of customary law can be 
conducted by questioning informants with rule-directed interviews. 
The rule-directed technique, which has been used extensively by the 
Restatement of African Law Project at the University of London, 
conforms closely to the "ideological" method outlined by Llewellyn 
and Boebel. 
Once we see that rules of customary origin have two dimensions, one 
which is amendable to empirical observation A, and one which is 
abstract and graspable only indirectly (2(B) (C)), it is but a short 
step to the realization that the descriptive and ideological methods 
are really but two sides to a more encompassing method which could 
have been called the iciealogical-descriptive method. Viewed this way 
apparently contradictory or inconsistent findings generated by either 
method when used independently of the other can be reconciled by 
reconstructing our data by indicating more precisely what they 
include and what they exclude. The ideological-descriptive method 
has a dual focus, but this should not generate inconsistent results, 
because rules of customary origin, like all social facts, have two 
aspects, one internal and one external, and the foci of the 
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ideological-descriptive method is perfectly tailored to fit the aim 
of investigating these different aspects. Here then is a perfect 
exemplification of Merton's thesis that conceptual analysis may often 
resolve antinomies in empirical findings by indicating that such 
contradictions are more apparent than real. 
The model of social facts gives us an analytical framework with which 
to distinguish mere social habits or custom from bone fide customary 
law. This is a problem that has bedeviled legal anthropology since 
its inception. We now have the beginnings of a way of dealing with 
it. We also have a way of dealing with the contradictory findings 
which Roberts' use of the ideological and descriptive methods 
produced. In light of the model of social facts such contradictory 
findings will not be logically possible. For by seeing that the 
ideological and descriptive methods are really ~ method, it becomes 
apparent that inconsistent findings produced by the two methods must 
be more apparent than real, thereby calling for data reconstruction. 
The answers given by the old men, for example, might have reflected 
the views of a bygone generation, while current practices might have 
represented current ways of doing things. Analysis of the group 
structure of the Tswana unit investigated by Roberts might have shown 
the existence of a generation gap between old ways of doing things 
(to which lip service is paid) and new ways (which are simply done) . 
Roberts' inconsistent findings can also be traced back to a crudely 
defined notion of custom, employed also by Llewellyn and Boebel, 
which conflates usage and Ql>inio juris. Or, better, which fails to 
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separate them precisely. 
'l'he ideoloqical-descriptive method (as I have called it) is aimed at 
rules of customary oriqin which arise outside of the context of 
litiqation. I think, however, that the main aim of the trouble case 
method is to learn about rules which underlie and define the 
operations of court-like institutions in customary society. 
Accordinq to Llewellyn and Boebel (1941: 24), such rules were called 
"litigious custom" by Vinogradoff, and they were separated by him 
from "qeneral custom" which he thouqht of as rules which impose 
obligations (and are applicable to the entire community) . Llewellyn 
referred to litigious custom as the "purest stuff of law", and both 
he and Boebel conceived such custom to be concerned with such 
questions as the following: 
What person, or range of persons, is the proper one to 
proceed? What penalty, or what variety of penalties, is 
proper for such an offence? What tribunal, or what ritual, 
or what form of notice and summons, or of declaration 
before retaliation, is prescribed? (1941: 26). 
Litigious rules of customary oriqin approximate what Bart has 
characterized as "secondary" or public "power conferring" rules, and 
it is the principal thesis of the Concept Q.f Law that law can best 
be understood as a combination of such rules with primary or duty 
imposing rules of obliqation. Power conferring rules accordinq to 
Bart and Searle impose status functions on individuals that give them 
-125-
certain powers. These constitutive rules define a group of important 
legal concepts such as the concepts of judge, court, jurisdiction and 
judgement. They set up criteria for identifying individuals who are 
empowered to adjudicate and define the procedures to be followed by 
them. They may be said to be on a different "level" than duty 
imposing rules in the sense that while primary rules are concerned 
with what actions that people must do and not do, secondary rules are 
concerned with primary rules themselves. They specify the ways in 
which primary rules may be ascertained, "introduced, eliminated, 
varied", and the fact of their violation determined. Their 
introduction into society, according to Bart, "is a step forward as 
important to society as the invention of the wheel", and "may fairly 
be considered as the step from the pre-legal into the legal world" 
(1961: 89-96). As explained in Chapter Three, the introduction of 
constitutive rules may be regarded as the step from the pre-social 
to the social world. It is only a certain kind of constitutive rules 
which lead to the legal world, which Hart calls Power-Conferring 
rules. What we need to do next is refine the relationship between the 
inside and the outside of social facts. In order to do this I will 
analyse what Hart has to say about the external aspect of rules in 
greater detail. 
We noted previously that Hart's theory of rules contained provisions 
for distinguishing rule-governed from mere convergent or habitual 
forms of social behaviour. He introduces his model by asking a 
deceptively simple question: "Bow does a rule differ from a social 
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habit?" Another way of posing this question, which we considered in 
the previous section, is "How does (mere) custom differ from 
customary law?" We must now go deeper into Hart's answer to these 
questions in order to fortify the critique of behaviourism suggested 
in Searle's account. This will also allow us to see how the model 
of social facts can clarify rule-scepticism in legal anthropology. 
Hart states that there is certainly one point of similarity between 
rules and social habits: "in both cases the behaviour in question 
must be general, which means that it must be regular and convergent 
and that it is repeated when occasion arises by most of the group" 
(1961: 54). Hart thinks that this much at least is implied in the 
phrase "they do it as a rule". But though there is this similarity 
there are three salient differences which Hart notes between a rule 
and a social habit. 
First, for a group to have a social habit it is sufficient that their 
behaviour in fact converges. Deviation from the regular course need 
not be a matter for any form of criticism. Such convergence of 
behaviour is however not enough to constitute the existence of a rule 
requiring the behaviour. Rather, "where there is such a rule 
deviations are generally regarded as lapses or faults open to 
criticism, and threatened deviations meet with pressure for 
conformity" (1961: 54). Secondly, where there are such rules, not 
only is criticism in fact made, but deviation from the standard 
imposed B(3) is generally accepted as a good reason for making it. 
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Criticism for deviation is regarded as legitimate or justified. Just 
how many of the group must treat the regular mode of behaviour as a 
standard (B(2) (3)) of criticism, and how often and for how long they 
must do it to warrant the claim that the group has a rule are not 
definite matters according to Bart. We need only remember that the 
statement that a group has a certain rule is compatible with the 
existence of a minority who not only break the rule but refuse to 
look upon it as a standard for themselves or others. '?here may be 
a minority, that is, which recognises the existence of the general 
practice. '?hey may also recognise the fact that the majority of the 
group accept the practice B(2) and use it as a common standard B(3). 
'?hey themselves, however, refuse to accept B(2) as B(3). Since they 
do not take B(2) as a standard, they refuse to apply it to threatened 
or actual deviation from B(2). But this can only apply to a very 
limited section of the group. If a sizeable sub-group refuses to 
accept B (2) as a common standard, that rule may be brought into 
question. If it is an important power conferring rule, one which, 
for example, is used to identify the leader of the group, the group 
may find itself pulled apart by social conflict. In the case of the 
example given by Roberts, the old men were not prepared to accept the 
existence of a practice which they themselves regarded as "against 
the law". Yet according to Roberts the practice did exist. 'rhe old 
men pretended that A did not exist. Consider another example. In 
some societies it is said that pre-marital sexual intercourse is 
"wrong". 'rhe wrongness of the act comes from measuring it against 
a standard B (3) which is based on a social abstraction B (2) of 
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abstinance from sexua1 intercourse before forma1 marriage ceremonies. 
That rea1 practice A may or may not exist. Often peop1e wi11 assert 
that the practice of abstinance exists, and then~~ as B(3), 
even where the practice does not exist, or is not genera1 in the 
group. But if the practice of abstinance is practica11y non-existant 
in the group, no matter how often or for how 1ong a vociferous 
minority may c1aim otherwise, there can hard1y be a ~ against pre-
marita1 intercourse. Without the practice conditions, or the 
externa1 aspect of the ru1e, the standard itse1f can on1y be an 
exhortation. And exhortations a1one are insufficient for the 
existence of ru1es. 
The third feature which distinguishes socia1 ru1es from socia1 habits 
is Bart's interna1 aspect of ru1es. When a habit or a custom is 
genera1 in a group, this genera1i ty is mere1y a fact about the 
observab1e behaviour of most of the group. In order that there 
shou1d be such a socia1 practice no members of the group need in any 
way be cognizant of the genera1 behaviour or even know that the 
behaviour in question is genera1. Sti11 1ess need they strive to 
teach or intend to transmit or maintain it. It is sufficient that 
each for his part behaves in the way that others a1so in fact do. 
By contrast, if a socia1 ru1e is to exist some at 1east must 1ook 
upon the behaviour in question as a genera1 standard (B(2) (3)) to be 
fo11owed by the group as a who1e. If a minority refuses to abide by 
the ru1e, that is, to accept B(2) as B(3), they may be expe11ed by 
the group. Bart i11ustrates the interna1 aspect of ru1es by 
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considering the rules of chess. Chess players do not merely have 
similar habits of moving the King or the Queen in the same way that 
an external observor, who knew nothing about their attitudes to the 
moves they make, could record. In addition they have a critical 
reflective attitude B(l) to this pattern B(2) and they accept it as 
a common standard B(3) for all who play the game. Each person not 
only moves the pieces in a certain way himself, but has views about 
the property of all moving them in that way. Such views are 
"manifested in criticism of others and demands for conformity made 
upon others when deviation is actual or threatened, and in 
acknowledgements of the ligitimacy of such criticisms and demands 
when received from others" (1961: 55). 
We have already noticed that it is possible to be concerned with 
rules either as a Kantian observor or as a member of a group. But 
statements made from the external point of view may be of two kinds. 
First, the observor may attempt to occupy the position of a natural 
scientist who does not even refer to the way the group regards their 
own behaviour. Secondly, he may, without accepting the rules 
himself, assert that the group accepts certain rules, and thus may 
refer from "outside" to the way they are concerned with the linkages 
between A and B(2) and B(3). But if the observor does attempt to 
keep to the Kantian external point of view, he makes no reference to 
Geist (i.e., the intelligible world) at all. The most he will be 
able to give will be descriptions of meaningless phenomena. In fact, 
it may not even be possible for the observor to "see" phenomena at 
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all if there is no (B(2) (3)) dimension of life. 
One reason for this is that the observor will lack "understanding" 
of what group members are doing. Their movements will be 
unintelligible to him. There is of course the possibility that the 
Kantian observer may use his own common-sense notions to interpret 
their behaviour, but in that case he will have no way of knowing for 
sure if the interpretations he places on their behaviour faithfully 
represent what they are doing. For in order to understand what an 
agent is doing we must understand what he "thinks" he is doing. An 
essential feature of actions ~ rule-following behaviour is their 
conceptual content, the B(3) element. Concept users make judgements 
which involve the cognitive ability to subsume occasions of behaviour 
under categories. Occasions of behaviour must be subsumed under 
categories of behaviour if they are to "count as" an instance of the 
latter. Once they are so instantiated, they are measured against the 
common standards B(3) that have been abstracted from the patterns 
that particular occasions instantiate. It is, in fact, on this basis 
that some philosophers distinguish human beings from brutes which are 
caused to act dispositionally by laws of nature that a Kantian 
external observor could theoretically observe and codify. 
Once agents have grasped a rule, that is, once they have been taught 
to recognise occasions of behaviour as instances of (B(2)), and take 
(B(2)) as (B(3)), its use may become automatic or dispositional, so 
that we can say that it is "natural", but rule-following is an 
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activi ty which cannot, according to Bart, be reduced to a set of 
theoretical formulae in accordance with exceptionless laws of nature. 
To understand this we must consider what Bart says about the 
distinction between following a rule and merely acting in accordance 
with one. Very often when a person accepts a rule he may see what 
it requires in a flash and do that without thinking of the rule 
(B(2) (3)) or what it requires. Rule-following behaviour is often a 
direct response to a situation (as when the batter runs to the base 
after hitting the ball) unmediated by calculation in terms of rules. 
But does this mean that no rule is being followed, because there was 
no conscious attention to the rule at the time of or before the act? 
Not according to Bart. Following Wittgenstein, Bart argues that 
evidence that such actions are appli~ations of a rule is in their 
setting in certain circumstances. 
A factor that is important for showing that in acting one has 
followed a rule is that if the behaviour is challenged the agent is 
disposed to justify it by reference to the rule. That is, the agent 
will point to the existence of certain practices which he claims he 
is following, and will argue that the group has taken these practices 
as a common standard B(3). And if this explanation is not merely 
spurious it will be manifested not only in past and subsequent 
general confox:mity to it, and acknowledgements of it, but also in his 
criticism of his own and other's deviations from it. If, says Bart, 
before a person's "unthinking" compliance with a rule, he had been 
asked to say what the "right" thing to do was, he would, if honest, 
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have cited the rule. It is in the qeneral context of an aqent's 
behaviour and not in its accompaniment by any explicit thouqht of the 
rule that it is necessary to distinquish an action which is really 
a case of rule-followinq from one that merely happens to coincide 
with it. It is thus that we should distinquish, for example, as 
compliance with an accepted rule, the adult chess player's move from 
the action of an inf ant who merely pushed the piece into the riqht 
place. 
The intentions that an aqent forms closely track the concepts he uses 
and are constituted by the rules qoverning the use of such concepts. 
If we want to explain the actions of people we must regard their 
behaviour as quided by "oughts" rather than causally conditioned 
responses to physical conditions. An agent's actions are an 
expression of reasons he has adopted in terms of his commitments to 
his own life projects and interests. When an anthropologist 
identifies the concepts according to which a person acts, he maps or 
charts the behaviour on to a range of rule-following practices B(2). 
An observor adhering to the Kantian external point of view will not 
be able to discern the concepts that are structuring the behaviour. 
The common standards B(3) element of rule-following are non-sensible. 
Therefore they are not phenomenal in the Kantian sense. Thus the 
Kantian observor will be unable to understand an agent's behaviour -
there will be no comprehension of the intelligible world. Nor will 
any ties or linkages be possible for the Kantian observor between the 
intelligible world and the world of appearances and phenomena. 
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Behaviourism cannot for this reason capture the rule-following 
actions of people. The behaviouristic explanation of action is a 
misquided aspiration based on a neglect of internal relations and 
conceptual connections. 
The Kantian observor's point of view also leads to rule-sceptisism. 
For if we proceed on the Kantian assumption that we cannot, through 
participation with others in the intelligible world, get "behind" 
appearances, and so keep to the observor's external point of view, 
and do not thereby give any account of the manner in which members 
who accept the abstract standards B(3) view their own regular and 
irregular behaviour, our descriptions cannot be in terms of rules at 
all, and so not in terms of the rule-dependent notions of "right" and 
"wrong", "ought", "must" and "should", etc. As a result, the Kantian 
observor will have no way of distinguishing authentic rule-following 
and deviant behaviour from spurious rule-following or deviance that 
may be falsely ascribed to someone. Because of this the rule 
sceptic's claim in legal anthropology that "customary law is merely 
what the people say it is" may seem valid to the Kantian observor. 
The model of social facts helps us clarify this important but 
misguided claim. 
One understanding of this claim comes from an ambiguity resulting 
from a failure to distinguish an already established system of rules 
from the way in which these rules are brought into being or, better, 
the conditions of their existence. Even though rule-following and 
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deviant behaviour are created by the critical response of the 
community, an internal feature of that response is the conception of 
an "objective" order of events whose character is presupposed as 
"independent" of the immediate response of the community. There is 
a sense in which it is true (but enormously misleading) to say that 
customary law is what the people say it is. If there were no 
sanctioning behaviour there could be no rules, for we should have no 
way of teaching and learning the abstract categories of behaviour 
(B(3)) they impose and of which, in part, they consist. In one sense 
rules are created by the actual, visible critical behaviour of the 
group, but it would be a mistake to infer from this true proposition 
the false proposition that this public response is itself a 
sufficient condition for the existence of binding rules and objective 
normative constraint. By adopting an "outsiders" model of social 
facts the behaviourist leaves out of his account of the basis of 
group life the way that members view their own behaviour. Thus it 
might seem plausible (but, is, in fact, false) to think that the 
critical response of the community is a sufficient condition for the 
existence of rule-following or deviant behaviour. This has important 
consequences. One of them is that the rule sceptic's claim that 
"customary law is what the people say it is" gains more plausibility 
than it deserves. This is actually a spurious, surface credibility, 
as the model of social facts helps illustrate. 
There is another version of rule scepticism in legal anthropology. 
It amounts to the contention that rules of customary origin are not 
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noxmally used deductively. Instead they are twisted and manipulated 
for personal and political advantage. The arqument is that there is 
nothinq to circumscribe people's use of discretion in their use of 
customary rules because of their loose and unwritten character. It 
is thus arqued that it is false to think that people are in any way 
subject to or "bound" to act as they do. They may act with 
sufficient predictable reqularity, the arqument goes, but beyond this 
there is nothing which can be characterized as a rule which they 
follow. The arqument is that there is nothing that people treat as 
criteria, or standards, of customary law, and so nothinq in their 
behaviour which manifests the internal point of view characteristic 
of the acceptance of B(3). But Bart points out that to arque this 
way, in ADY sphere of life, is to iqnore what rules actually are 
(1961: 135). While it is true that deception and rule manipulations 
may under circumstances exist and for a while even be regarded as 
norm.al, it is not logically possible that rule-following shou1d 
always be like this. To say that some Dollar bills are counterfeit, 
for example, presupposes a general background of use of authentic 
bills most of the time by most people, and rule-following is also 
like this. In reasonably stab1e social structures rules are for the 
most part known and followed, and it is against this general 
background of compliance that rule manipulations can exist at the 
margins. To arque otherwise impales us on the horns of a false 
di1emma, namely that rules are always what they might be in some 
Platonic heaven - always known, always recoqnized, always followed -
or there are no rules at all. Everything is pretence and 
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manipulation. As everybody knows this is not to say that pretence 
and manipulation are not possible and sometimes successful. Tests 
for whether a person has merely pretended ex poste facto that he 
acted on a rule, or that another has broken a rule, are like all 
empirical tests fallible. It is possible that in deeply divided 
societies without secondary rules group members might reach their 
decision about or base their ascriptions of deviance upon arbitrary 
feelings of dislike or prejudice, and then merely choose from a 
catalogue of already established and accepted rules one which, they 
pretended, resembled the case at hand. They might then claim that 
this was the rule that had been violated. Comaroff (1974) and 
Comaroff and Roberts (1981) have shown that rules are often used this 
way in some small-scale societies. Some customary court decisions 
may also be like this, and arguments to the effect that customary law 
is merely what the people, the chief or the King say it is can make 
a powerful appeal to an anthropologist's candour. But in social 
structures which have taken the step described by Hart from the "pre-
legal" to the "legal" world rule-twisting and power politics must be 
the exception and not the rule. 
Hart's social fact theory of law gives us a way of assessing this 
claim. In order to see this we must consider how other legal 
anthropologists have used Hart's model. Lloyd Fallers, for example, 
used Hart's theory of law to argue that "law" is a variable of which 
there can be "more" or "less" in different customary systems (1969) . 
FaJ.lers invoked Hart' s model of law to show how there can be 
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different "staqes" in the development from the pre-leqal to the leqal 
world. 
Comaroff and Roberts claim that their findinqs about rule-twistinq 
and rule manipulation in certain Tswana qroups "have reinforced 
existinq doubts about the value of distinquishinq 'the leqal' as a 
discrete field of inquiry" (1981: 243) . But rather than havinq 
"found" that the law/politics dichotomy is not a qood one, Bart's 
model help us see that they have merely assumed this. Thus when they 
cite Barkun' s view that law should be seen as a "system of 
manipulable symbols" (1968: 20) they iqnore the fact that he was 
comparinq customary law in small-scale societies with international 
customary law. Moreover, Barkun himself adopted Bart's leqal-
developmental model. Bart's social fact model of law sees both types 
of law as lackinq certain features which are found in modern 
municipal leqal systems. Both customary and international law lack 
Hart's "secondary rules" which, when added to a diffuse and 
undifferentiated set of primary rules results in the step "from the 
pre-leqal to the leqal world". These secondary rules are the 
preserve of specialized quasi-leqal institutions which are empowered 
by qeneral society to apply them in dispute so that primary rules may 
be conclusively and authoritatively ascertained. In societies 
without such secondary rules, such as in international law which 
lacks specialized orqans with the power of enforcinq their 
judqements, and in certain small-scale societies such as (apparently) 
some Tswana qroups, the primary rules will of course resemble a 
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"system of manipulable symbols", because there will be no agency or 
institution empowered to render such indeterminate primary rules 
determinate by issuing authoritative proclamations about their 
meanings. :Instead, the meaning of the normative repertoire will 
forever remain indeterminate, plastic and subject to unending auto-
manipulations by self-seeking individuals and groups. 
:In such a situation it will of course be true that the dichotomy 
between "law" and "politics" (rule following and rule manipulation) 
will be largely "chimerical" as Comaroff and Roberts claim. But what 
about small-scale societies which have developed Bart's secondary 
rules, such as the Basoga of Uganda (at one time)? Should we not say 
that there, where specialized legal institutions and secondary rules 
have been introduced, a successful separation of law and politics is 
after all possible and sometimes achieved? Fallars has argued that 
the Basoga, by adopting secondary rules, display a commitment to the 
"rule of law". This phrase refers to the existence of a government 
of laws "and not of men". The rule of law is born, in this sense, 
when legal institutions acquire enough independent authority to 
impose standards of restraint on the exercise of rule manipulation 
and power politics. Law is elevated "above" politics. Roberts has 
said that the "independence of the judiciary" is just a feature of 
Western legal ideology (1979: 22). The implication of this is that 
the idea of a court which has removed itself from the political arena 
is not possible, not even in modern societies. But it is a truism 
in sociology that if people define social facts as "real", they can 
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become real "in their consequences" . The same is true of an 
"independent" judiciary. The ideal of an independent judiciary is 
something that can be attained in degrees of "more" and "less" in 
modern and, as the work of some legal anthropologists has shown, in 
some small-scale societies as well. 
What the social fact model of law has to offer legal anthropologists 
is a comprehensive framework of thought which can bring to the study 
of customary law the concepts that are needed to pull together and 
systematize the current piecemeal and unfocussed state of its 
research. If we stand back and consider the structure which has 
resulted from the model of social facts I have introduced, it seems 
evident that we have a powerful tool with which to consolidate and 
unify the triad of methodological approaches outlined by Llewellyn 
and Hoebel. This model gives us new ways of assessing current 
theories in legal anthropology, and clarifies basic concepts of 
agency and rule-following that allow us to better see the 
insufficiencies of behaviourism in legal anthropology. Customary law 
is a social fact. But tracing out lei tfaden between these two 
conceptions I have shown that the social fact model works. It makes 
contact with the basic structure of social reality that underlies all 
the special social sciences . That can be used to clarify and 
sharpen issues in the special sciences. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 
Searle recognizes "toqetherness" as a vital inqredient of collective 
intentionality. But because he locates collective intentionality "in 
the head", and insists that we "live in one world", he leaves 
somethinq fundamental out of his picture. By examininq Margaret 
Gilbert's treatment of "plural subject phenomena" we can see more 
precisely how this is so. 
Gilbert, in her book Qn Social Facts (1989), is concerned, like 
Searle, with a theory of social facts. Like Searle, she treats the 
idea of people doinq something "together" as basic to the idea of 
social reality. But what is togetherness, and what does it entail? 
In what follows I will outline Glbert's Durkheimian and Simmelian 
answer to these questions. 
In attempting to come to terms with the idea of doing something 
"together", Gilbert begins with a consideration of Weber's conception 
of Soziales Band.eln (roughly, an action by an individual that "takes 
account of" the actions of another) . Gilbert is not happy with 
Weber's treatment of social action, finding it too "individualistic" 
and insufficient to do the job of explaining how society is possible. 
Gilbert thinks that social phenomena, and in particular collective 
behaviour (which she seems to regard as a narrower conception) cannot 
be reduced to sequences of actions performed by individuals. She 
accepts that social phenomena have an existence which is somehow 
-141-
"independent" of individuals, but she puzzles over what it miqht be. 
She rejects the view, along with Searle, that collective or group 
phenomena can be reduced to "externally observable structures". But 
unlike Searle she refuses to allow that collective intentionality can 
be "reduced" to mental or psychological states or phenomena that 
exist "in the head". Gilbert thinks there is somethinq "in addition" 
to these phenomena (which are closely related but conceptually 
distinct) which we must understand if we are to qet to the bottom of 
the possibility of social reality. What is it and how do we 
demarcate it? 
In attemptinq to find out what distinguishes social phenomena from 
sheer physical or psycholoqical phenomena Gilbert beqins by 
criticizing the notion of convention. Searle states that we must not 
confuse rules with conventions, but he never makes it clear just what 
he thinks the distinction is. Although Searle calls for a more 
perspicuous theory of rules, and refers to the "familiar internal 
point of view" of rules, a careful reading of his treatise shows that 
he is very thin on the nature of rules, especially on the conceptual 
content of rules, and he nowhere makes it apparent what he thinks 
"conventions" might be, as against rules, or how they may be similar 
and at the same time different. Some writers define conventions in 
the way that we have defined "custom". But many others use the idea 
of convention in different ways. Lewis, for example, used 
"convention" as a master concept to include a number of other 
conceptions, including the idea of a rule. Be thouqht of this latter 
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concept as a messy cluster concept with no real settled meaning. In 
his book Convention: A philosophical Study (1969) and elsewhere Lewis 
has spent a lot of time arguing that rules can be reduced to their 
external, physical dimension alone. Since Gilbert thinks that rules 
are paradigms of social facts, she refuses to be led a1ong this road, 
because she denies that social. facts can be "reduced" to their 
visible dimension alone. Gilbert explains that Lewis's treatment of 
rul.es leaves him with nothing to fall. back on in order to explain the 
"normativity" and "ought" of social (and moral) obligation. Gilbert 
embarrasses Lewis by catching and holding him on this point. She 
says that collective phenomena must be both "collective" and 
"normative" and successfully argues that Lewis's model. satisfies 
neither of these criteria. 
A second prong of Gilbert's criticism of Lewis's conception of social 
facts traces the limitations of his game theoretic conception of 
social action. In such a scheme two or more individuals confront 
each other and then ask "what should .I do?" The conceptual 
framework of the "plural. subject" that Gilbert introduces is quite 
different from this. From the point of view of "us" it may not be 
obvious that the utilities of individual decisions taken from a 
first-person point of view are relevant to what "we" are doing or 
what is best for "us". But what is the status of the "we" that 
constitutes the plural subject phenomenon? Can "we" or "us" be 
reduced to the concrete individuals involved (as Lewis thinks) or to 
psychological. phenomena "in their heads" (as Searl.e thinks) or is 
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there something more involved? I have already indicated that there 
is something more involved. Gilbert's arguments give weight to my 
analysis. She thinks there is "something more" than physical or 
psychological phenomena involved when two or more people do something 
together. An illustration sharpens Gilbert's intuition. After a 
lovers' spat two individuals retire to their corners and consider 
making up. "I must give 'us' a chance" she thinks. Now, what is the 
status of the "us"? What is it she wants to consider preserving, 
possibly even at the expense of her own individual utilities? 
According to Gilbert it is the "plural subject". But can plural 
subjects be identified with the thoughts, feelings and sentiments, 
etc. of the individuals involved, or is it something more, something 
"bigger than both of us", and if so how do we cash out this 
attractive but mysterious metaphor? According to Gilbert, in order 
for plural subjects to exist, the participants must themselves have 
the "concept" of a plural subject. 
Gilbert defines plural subject conceptions as basic to institutional 
or social concepts. But she refuses to reduce these concepts to 
psychological "ideas" in the minds of individual people (like 
Searle) . She does not deny that individual people can "grasp" and 
use these social concepts, but somehow, she thinks, they exist at a 
different "level" from psychological phenomena, and cannot be reduced 
to them nor located "in the head" as Searle supposes. Plural subject 
conceptions are according to Gilbert following Durkheim 
collective representations. Conceptions like "us" or "we" are 
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generically like "France" or "the government". They name collective 
entities. In his Primitive Classification Durkheim said that, in the 
evolution of society, "us" and "them" were the first classifications, 
the first collective ideas. Having learned to use "the same" and 
"different" in this way, we then extend this abstract knowledge to 
other phenomena. The introduction of collective representations, 
according to Durkheim, constitutes the step from the pre-social to 
the social world. Gi1bert accepts this position. She realizes that 
in order for plural subjects to exist they must use concepts, and she 
is unwilling to "reduce" these concepts to more primitive 
psychological phenomena. Most importantly, she realizes that people 
must have the ability to "grasp" and use these concepts, otherwise 
they would be free-floating and inaccessible to individuals. Gilbert 
rejects any kind of "bad" Platonism such as the one discussed in 
Chapter Five. Like Durkheim she can be called a "social Platonist" 
on the ground that she refuses to "reduce" abstracta to concreta, and 
sees both as aspects of a larger social whole. 
Lewis, on the other hand, like the philosophers to whom his work has 
appeal , cannot accept the "reality" of concep·ts . Be is tediously 
cautious to avoid stating his views so baldly, but any objective 
analysis of his theory of conventions shows him to be deepl.y 
suspicious of the notion. Searl.e, l.ikewise, notwithstanding the 
substantial differences between his treatment of rul.es and Lewis's 
treatment of them, is deepl.y sceptical about the "ontol.ogical" status 
of "concepts". Searl.e accepts that epistemol.ogy has a rol.e to pl.ay 
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in philosophy, but he rejects the view that it is at the core of 
philosophical problems. While Searle locates concepts "in the head" 
of individuals as psychological phenomena (which can ultimately be 
reduced to biological phenomena, and thus to physical and chemical 
processes) Lewis is even more primitive in wanting to reduce concepts 
to observable regularities of behaviour alone. This is especially 
clear in his treatment of language. Be recognizes a verbal 
distinction between language and speech, but as far as he can see 
language is nothing more than "speech". I:n fact, mere noise, because 
Lewis has no way of accounting for the possibility of explaining how 
we group sounds under units of meaning in order to produce 
intelligible communication. Be has no account of "concept-grasp". 
Nor has he any way of explaining the normative aspect of language, 
its "conceptual constraint". Nor can he explain "necessity". 
Abstract "internal relations" are strictly taboo for Lewis. Gilbert 
is sensitive to all of these problems, because her theory of social 
facts is built on the idea that there are deep structures and 
"essences" in language. On a superficial level Searle's account of 
institutional facts agrees with Gilbert's. Searle accepts that 
institutional facts have a "logical structure" which result from the 
logical relations that exist between the representations that make 
them possible. But Searle treads lightly on this terrain, and gives 
no indication at all of how, if representations are only "in the 
head", logical, internal relations are possible. Gilbert cannot 
accept empiricist or psychological accounts of social phenomena 
(especially language and meaning) and she searches for and eventually 
-146-
finds a better account which is broad1y Durkheimian. 
In deve1oping her scheme of p1ura1 subject phenomena Gi1bert sees 
"society" everywhere. Not on1y in socia1 structures 1ike state and 
fami1y, but in a11 p1aces, in conversationa1 groups and in peop1e 
"going for a wa1k" together. She thinks that society begins the very 
moment p1ura1 subjects are formed, the moment peop1e start doing 
something "together". Some socio1ogica1 studies have investigated 
"togetherings" in terms of "identification categories" but these 
studies have not paid much attention to the onto1ogica1 status of 
these categories . They have mere1y invoked them as unexp1icated 
resources. Gi1bert on the other hand wants to make the "conceptua1 
apparatus" of p1ura1 subject phenomena a topic in its own right. She 
thinks that, u1timate1y, it is necessary to postu1ate a "P1atonic" 
conception of 1anguage and meaning if we are to exp1ain how group 
phenomena are possib1e. P1atonic phenomena are abstracta according 
to Gi1bert and they are "not quite in the head", nor can they be 
1ocated entire1y in "socia1 practices". They must occupy some "third 
rea1m" (about which Gi1bert says 1itt1e) which is not exhausted by 
the two rea1ms of the menta1 and the physica1. But what is this 
third rea1m? I have a1ready given some indication of what it 
invo1ves. But many Wittgensteinians have come up with the answer "it 
is nothing". This has been part of their empiricist strategy of 
e1iminating the who1e prob1em of abstract phenomena as a psuedo-
prob1em. In this regard Kripke' s interpretation has been given 
f1agship status in the rather ingrown wor1d of Wittgensteinian 
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scholarship. Kripke says that, rather than concerning himself with 
the formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions of "meaning", 
or with the "analysis" of meaning, Wittgenstein rejects such 
:"' 
endeavors as misguided and wanted instead only to consider what 
language games we play with such words and expressions. Rather than 
looking for the "essence" of these phenomena, Kripke thinks that 
Wittgenstein wanted to look only at the surface of such things, and 
to consider the "assertibility conditions" for the sentences we use 
when we talk about such things. Many Wittgensteinians have since 
tended to reject analyses of meaning and other transpersonal 
phenomena as based on mistaken philosophical theories. Gilbert 
rejects this whole scenario as thin and unconvincing. She wants to 
center the problem of concepts and concept-grasp as a serious problem 
for philosophical analysis. She notes that many analytical 
philosophers are "wary" (this is an understatement) of "reifying" 
concepts. Searle would certainly fall into this category. The 
problem however is that if concepts are, in a certain sense, "real", 
as Gilbert wants to argue, then the reification process is something 
to be understood, someth~ng to be investigated. Gilbert really must 
be congratulated for having the temerity to break free of dogmas in 
the analytical tradition in which she writes . But she is still 
captive of her paradigm. There is only so much latitude in the 
analytical paradigm in which she works and writes. Her apparent 
unwillingness, and perhaps to some extent inability, to move beyond 
the limits of the analytical school she criticizes leaves her with 
limited resources for working out a theory of concept-grasp, which 
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she rightly sees as central to the whole problem of plural subject 
phenomena. Gilbert accepts Kripke's "skeptical paradox" (that any 
fact pattern can be made to comport with the formulation of just 
about any rule) as unresolvable, saying that "the condition that 
one's linguistic behaviour be coverable by rules is useless" (1989: 
75) . But this sounds like an admission of defeat for her project of 
understanding social and institutional concepts and the "concept-
grasp" that is a necessary condition of plural subject phenomena. 
In fact, Gilbert is finally pushed to the view that the process of 
concept-grasp, language use, and meaningful behaviour is "a mystery". 
This comes after a long chapter dealing with Winch's treatment of 
rule-following and concept-grasp which she finally gives up on as 
hopeless. 
Analytical philosophy has dismissed the Platonic and Kantian 
traditions as based on an unrealistic "foundational" view of 
epistemology. Attempts to "naturalize" epistemology, or to read 
epistemology as peripheral to philosophy, are examples of this. But 
there is much in Winch's treatment of rule-following that, while not 
exactly "Kantian" in flavour, raises Kantian issues. To many it has 
seemed clear that Wittgenstein knew Kant (eg. Garver, 1989; Schwyzer, 
1990, etc.), and that he was struggling with Kantian foundational 
problems. In this light Wittgenstein can be seen as having 
introduced new and interesting (even "sociological") ways of 
formulating Kantian problems. What makes Winch's work interesting, 
and pioneering, is that he is one of the first to seize on this idea. 
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Wittgenstein' s rule-following considerations can plausibly be seen 
as an attempt to address the Kantian "one-over-many" problem. of 
concept-grasp (especially as dealt with in the "Empiciral Schematism" 
section of the Analytic) . Although many Wittgensteinians take from 
their master only his destructive and sometimes retrograde aspect, 
it is possible to take constructive ideas from his work on rule 
following, and this is what Winch attempted to do. Winch thought 
that the "reaction of others" are partially constitutive of someone's 
following a rule. Winch was introducing an aspect of Wittgenstein's 
sociological "theory" of internal relations. This is an extremely 
suggestive point and introduces a sociological dimension to the 
Kantian problem of concept grasp that is Hegelian in spirit. To say 
that the reactions of others are something like logically necessary 
conditions of rule following is a clue to understanding the "public" 
aspect of rule following (and the "objective" validity of concepts) . 
This idea was developed by Hegel and Durkheim in a sketchy way before 
Wittgenstein came along. This idea, which Winch obtained from his 
reading of Wittgenstein's constructive side, also finds clear 
expression in Bart's work on rules. Thus , a lot of ideas come 
together and make sense if read in the light of how Wittgenstein, 
Durkheim and Hegel attempted to "sociologize" the 1st Critique. 
Gilbert and Searle miss out on this. Gilbert must at least be given 
credit for trying to make sense of the problem of concept grasp. She 
is right to say that analytical philosophers have a "thin concept of 
a concept". They regard it as a discredited notion. Why? Because 
there is something about abstract "concepts", unlike psychological 
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"ideas", that seems mysterious. So even at the risk of being 
labelled a "mysterian" Gilbert has attempted to plumb this mystery. 
But in attempting her own rehabilitation of the "concept of a 
concept" Gilbert makes little headway. The most that she safely 
ventures is that concepts "gather similar things together" into a 
"unity" and "under a rule", but her treatment of these notions does 
not cover much ground. Ber Q,§ novo attempt to analyse the notion of 
a "unity" shows no familiarity with the Kant-Hegel literature on this 
important topic. Although she knows that the notion of "publicity" 
is, like the idea of a unity (or a unit), critical to an 
understanding of the process of concept-grasp, she is unable to 
develop these ideas or put them into any kind of framework. 
While it is true, as Gilbert says, that publicity is a slippery 
notion, some distinctions can now be made which allow us a grip on 
it. We can identify the "publicity of meaning" with Popper's 
"objective knowledge". Durkheim's collective representations are 
"objective" in the same sense: they are "out there" - they are not 
"in the head" as Searle supposes. They cannot be reduced to 
subjective mental phenomena in the minds of individuals. This seems 
clear enough. But it is important to see that this "third realm" 
conception of social fact is related to yet another dimension of 
publicity with which it is often confused. The second sense of 
publicity is well captured by Winch. Basically, Winch's treatment 
of the publicity of meaning (and rule following) comes to this: there 
must be behavioural correlates ~ meaning, and these must be 
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sufficient to enable those listening to a speaker to "grasp" the 
meaning in question and to tell if a person is following rules 
correctly. Durkheim's cousin notion of the "exteriority" of social 
meaning refers in part, but not in whole (as some have thought) to 
its "openness to view". The "patterns of behaviour" that constitute 
the external aspect of rules are "visible indices" which "stand for", 
"represent" and are dialectically implicated with abstract collective 
representations (B(2) (3)). Thus, a number of related ideas from 
Winch, Hart, Durkheim and Wittgenstein blend together to add a 
sociological dimension to the Kantian problematic in the 1st 
Critique. These ideas are, I have argued, in a broad sense 
"Hegelian". 
Both Gilbert and Searle are concerned with the question posed in the 
title of Simmel' s essay "How is Society Possible?" (1971; [first 
published in German in 1908]) . For many this essay marks the 
beginning of cognitive sociology. Although subsequent writers (eg, 
Schutz, 1962, Cicourel, 1974) have moved away from Simmelian themes, 
none have been able to escape from the question posed in Simmel's 
essay title. Simmel regarded this as a Kantian question about how 
"judgement" is "possible", because without judgements of "the same" 
and "different", he thought, society is impossible. Today many 
Wittgensteinians argue that without society, judgement (ie, rule 
following) is impossible. The question of what, if anything, 
presupposes what (rule following or society?) divides 
Wittgensteinians as nothing else today, the same as it did over forty 
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years ago when they first queried the possibility of an asocial 
language-user. 
There are three possibilities to consider: 
1) rule-following (ie, judgement) is a necessary condition of 
society. 
2) society is a necessary condition of rule-following. 
3) society is a necessary and sufficient condition of rule-
following. 
I think that, in the end, (3) will turn out to be right. Claim (2) 
has been argued out but a consensus has emerged that rule-following 
by asocial solitaries is impossible, for the broadly Wittgensteinian 
reason that (a) without an external or public "check" there can be 
no way of distinguishing genuine from apparent cases of rule 
following, or from mistakes, and (b) without a social context of 
practice we should have no way of teaching and learning rules. 
I have already mentioned that rule-following or "concept-grasp" is 
thought by Gilbert to be central to the problem of explaining the 
possibility of society. Gilbert is clearly interested in Simmel's 
question, but she is not able to take up the Kantian challenge it 
poses. Having made no headway with the problem of concept-grasp, 
Gilbert flirts briefly with the kind of psychologism advanced by 
Searle's claim that collective intentionality (representations, 
concepts, etc.) are "in the head". She wonders if, after all, the 
psychic fact of "consciousness" of constituting a "we" or "us" may 
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be "all there is" to group phenomena. Some of Simmel's descriptions 
of group phenomena, when read out of context, seem. to indicate that 
he might have toyed with the same idea. Gil.bert cites very few 
actual passages from Simmel, but one that she does cite seems to 
suggest an ambivalent attitude on Simmel's part toward the status of 
group phenomena. Thus it is not clear (to me) to what extent 
Gilbert's version of what she calls the "Simmelian schema" really 
does support Simmel's actual. position on this point. It is true 
that, for Simmel, the "consciousness of sociation" really is the 
"inner significance" of "sociation". But this is a psychological 
observation and not a statement of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. It is independent of and need not be read as subtracting 
anything of importance from Simmel's "social. real.ism". 
Simmel. had said of individuals that "they l.ook at one another as 
through a veil" (1908; 1971: 8-12). "We see, not the other as a pure 
individual" but rather "the other appears to us in generalized 
forms". "It is onl.y by means of social general.izations" that 
"rel.ationships we know as social ones become possibl.e" (1971: 8) . 
Simmel's question "Bow is society possibl.e?" Is actual.l.y more exact: 
he wanted to know "what, quite generally, and ~ priori, are 
processes of sociation?" Bow is it possible that there exists "the 
production of a societal unit out of individuals ... ?" (1971: 10) . 
Simmel's Kantian answer was: "an intel.l.ectual. capacity" for making 
"judgements" of "similarity and dissimilarity" (1971: 12) . This 
capacity for "synthesis" has implications that Gil.bert does not 
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respond to. 
For Durkheim plural subject phenomena are not just the product of 
Kantian (individual) syntheses. Indeed Durkheim, like Hegel, 
regarded Kantian syntheses as insufficient for the existence of group 
phenomena. Durkheim, like Hegel, thought that social phenomena 
result from a sui generis synthesis that cannot be reduced to nor 
identified with Kantian individual syntheses. What kind of synthesis 
is this sui generis synthesis? Mead argued that it is "symbolic 
interaction". Durkheim regarded this "collective synthesis" as the 
"key" to unlocking his theory of social facts. It is thus important 
to see how Durkheim's sociologism breaks with Kantian individual 
synthesis and explains the possibility of "new phenomena". Like 
Hegel, Durkheim theorized that the structure of the social world, 
rather than being a synthesized imposition of individual people, is 
actually grounded in an intelligible realm of collective thought that 
Plato rightly perceived as a realm of forms. But Durkheim was not 
a Platonist in any bad sense. Durkheim regarded "forms" as "social 
forms", and he believed that these social forms are linked by 
internal, logical relations to social practices which are grasped by 
the eye of the mind. It is this abstract system of collective 
representations that confers a more permanent and enduring structure 
of thought on the transient world of appearances. This is what makes 
society possible. Durkheim thought the Kantian model is 
"individualistic" for the same reasons we canvassed in Chapter Two. 
Kant's model is individualistic because the "unity" of things 
-155-
encountered in experience is "reducible" to the manifold of 
intuitions out of which they are constructed through individual acts 
of synthesis. But once the world is seen as possessing its own unity 
and structure, it is freed from having its form imposed on it by any 
individual, finite mind. There is clearly much more that needs to 
be said about this. Two questions, in particular, stand out as 
requiring heavy attention if we are to understand the Hegel-Durkheim 
modification of the Kantian doctrine: 
1) What is the "ontological" status of abstract categories and the 
epistemic conditions of social knowledge? 
2) What is the nature of the §Yi generis "synthesis" that makes 
these categories and conditions possible? 
These are fundamental questions of social metaphysics and 
epistemology. 
We know that Durkheim and Simmel had studied Kant's 1st Critique. 
Durkheim published serious work on Kantian ideas, which he tried to 
sociologize. Kantian ideas are found throughout Durkheim's writings, 
but especially in the final chapter of his Elementary Forms ~ 
Religious Life which was the last of his major works. Simmel's 
question "Bow is Society Possible?" was clearly inspired by his 
reading of the 1st Critique. The social forms that Hegel, Durkheim, 
Simmel and George Herbert Mead regarded as necessary for the 
existence of society need to be better understood. Their method of 
apprehension, the manner in which they are collectively brought into 
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being and persist, and the nature of the constraint they exercise on 
us at all levels - from the most microscopic (rules of inference) to 
the most macroscopic (historical "forces of destiny") - need to be 
made topics for philosophical investigation. 
I hope that analytical philosophers of the social sciences will begin 
to treat these problems with the respect they deserve. Where to 
begin now seems clear - we must go "back to Kant". But that alone 
is insufficient. We must also move beyond the model of the 1st 
Critique as Hegel, Durkheim and Simmel argued, and turn to answer the 
question "How is society possible?". This constitutes a profound 
challenge to social theorists who wish to move beyond the limits of 
Kantian social theory. 
POSTSCRIPT: 
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THE KANT-HEGEL LOOP 
I argued in Chapter Two that Kant's model in the 1st Critique is 
asocioloqical. But is there nothing whatsoever socioloqical in the 
Critique of ~ Reason? Where miqht we look to find "seeds" of 
socioloqical idealism in the Ist Critique? I claimed that Heqel's 
social reality has an "inside" in addition to an "outside" which an 
external observor could record, and that these two dimensions or 
"aspects" are tied toqether by conceptual or internal relations. I 
also suqqested that Kant apparently never saw this connection, or 
that in any case he never developed it in the Ist Critique. It is 
clear that Kant never developed this connection in the Ist Critique, 
but did he see it? Accordinq to some commentators he did see the 
connection. If this interpretation is riqht, then thinqs in 
themselves will not be located mysteriously "behind" the thinqs we 
do perceive, but will be those very same thinqs, but considered from 
another point of view. 
Kant did not look at thinqs this way. In the Ist Critique the 
spectator theory of observation is the last word. Kant is nothinq 
if not riqorous. Every point is firm, every line conclusive. Every 
sentence is aimed at some definite tarqet. Nothinq is superfluous. 
I think we must accept that he believed he had no warrant ~ right 
in the Ist Critique for supposinq anything about noumena (and thus 
nothinq about any relationship, or linkaqe, between noumena and 
phenomena). Kant's natural science methodoloqy cut him off from any 
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means of accessing the intelligible world. Al though there is a 
passage in the 2nd Edition where Kant alludes to the existence of a 
non-sensible "intelligible world" as being in some way related to our 
consciousness of our own existence (B430 - 431), his methodology 
forbids him from entertaining this idea. 
I myself have not been able to find anything sociological in the 
Critique of ~ Reason. This in itself proves nothing of course, 
but I have reason to believe that Kant intentionally, and studiously, 
kept the Ist Critique sociology-free for architechtonic and logical 
reasons. And I also have reason to believe that Kant was working out 
a theory of society in some of his post-Ist Critique writings. If 
these claims seem bizarre and unheard of, consider the following 
chronology: 
1781 Kritik der reinen Yernunft (Ist Ed.) 
1787 Kritik ~ reiner Vernunft (2nd Ed.) 
1785 Gruncilegung zur Metaphysik ~ Sitten 
1788 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 
1797 Die Metaphysic der Sitten 
1798 Anthropologie in pragmatischer Binsicht 
In his Gruncilegung (1785) Kant introduces the idea of "other rational 
beings" living in a "kingdom of ends" as part of his attempt to say 
what the good is. I think Collingwood is right to identify this 
kingdom of ends with society. In that same work Kant also introduces 
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his distinction between theoretical and practical reason (developed 
more fully in his Kritik ~ praktischen Vernunft) . These two kinds 
of reason introduce two different viewpoints according to some 
Kantian commentators. The point of view of theoretical reason in the 
Critigµe .Qt: Pure Reason is the spectator's viewpoint, but this is not 
the only point of view from which we can consider ourselves. We can 
also view ourselves as agents rather than as isolated knowers in an 
idealized model of Naturwissenschaft. And it is from this 
standpoint, that of agent and practical reasoner living in a society 
with other agents, that we can think of ourselves and society "from 
the inside". From the external observor's point of view we see the 
world (and ourselves as part of the world) as a system of causally 
related phenomena. As agents we see ourselves and others as 
"people" participating in an intelligible world. 
These themes are continued in a different way in Die Metaphysik der 
Sitten (1797) where Kant considers civil society as a society of 
benevolent agents. But it is in his anthropological writings that 
Kant begins to seriously work out the connection between the visible 
and the invisible (appearances and the intelligible world) that so 
exercised the mind of Hegel. In a passage in Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) which I regret I cannot trace at the 
moment, Kant mentions an explorer who believes he has discovered the 
ruins of an ancient temple, whereas his native guide sees nothing but 
a pile of rocks. The temple is part of the intelligible world. The 
pile of rocks is its visible manifestation. Are there two different 
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objects here, or merely one object viewed from two different 
perspectives? Kant was attempting to deal with a question that is 
central to theoretical sociology. 
Searle has more recently discussed the same problem. Searle points 
out that we can look at a coin or a Dollar bill from two 
perspectives. From one point of view - that of the natural sciences 
- the coin or Dollar bill is nothing but a piece of metal or a piece 
of paper with grey and green ink on it. And Popper has considered 
what his sociological "World 3" might look like from a materialistic 
point of view. Popper, like Searle, accepts that social facts are 
"embodied" in nature and somehow go beyond it. The former writes 
that natural science cannot do justice to World 3 phenomena because 
this point of view cannot cope with "the abstract character of World 
3 objects and especially with the logical relations existing between 
them" (1972: 89) . 
It seems reasonable to believe that Kant was considering the same 
problem.. If he was, his legacy to sociology ends in a knot that has 
yet to be unraveled. One might say that the, or at least a, central 
problem of the Critique ~ Pure Reason is to show how "pure 
concepts", though not derivable from things perceived, are still 
applicable to them. With the introduction of institutional concepts 
like "money", "debt", "uncle", "temple", and so on, we have a 
different but related problem. Even Durkheim was following Kant's 
discovery that in all knowledge, of whatever kind, there are A priori 
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elements. Like Kant he distinguised pure A priori knowledge from 
knowledge containing A priori elements, and he regarded sociology as 
an instance not of the former but of the latter. Be wrote that: 
It is necessary to show ... how it comes to pass that we 
can see certain relations in things which the 
examination of these things cannot reveal to us .... The 
real question is to know how it comes that experience is 
not sufficient unto itself, but pre-supposes certain 
conditions which are exterior and prior to it 
(1915:243). 
The idea of a temple or a coin is not in any way derivable from the 
empirical objects we call a pile of rocks or a piece of metal. An 
infrahuman or unsocialized solitary sees nothing but the physical 
objects, and then only if the empirical concepts needed to see them 
have been acquired. A social animal living in an intelligible world 
sees a "temple" or a "coin". When social facts are realized in 
intuition this is made possible through what Kant would have called 
a "schematic representation" which connects the object made visible 
through its empirical concept with the object "thought" through or 
as its collective idea. The very idea of such a connection raises 
what Smith has called the "linkage problem", which is about the 
relationship between social forms and the "patterns of behaviour" 
whose contents they are. It is possible, as Searle has suggested, 
that twenty-two women might line up and go through the same physical 
motions as are gone through by the members of two teams playing 
American football. But if there were no rules of the game, that is, 
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no antecedently existinq institution of football, there is no sense 
in which their movements could be linked to, or described as, 
"playinq football". Without Searle's "constitutive rules" (which he 
adapted from Kant's notion of constitutive principles) society, or 
Beqel' s "intelligible world", would not be possible. Searle 
socioloqized a Ist Critique conception to explain how institutional 
facts are "possible". These constitutive rules, or collective ideas, 
create and define new forms of behaviour - social behaviour - which 
transcend physical reality and cannot be reduced to it. According 
to Gellner socialized individuals "think" in terms of such concepts. 
Durkheim and Simm.el had similar things to say about "social forms" 
and "collective representations". There is nothinq even remotely 
close to this in Kant's considerations in the Ist Critique. But in 
his anthropological writings he seems to be considering Simm.el' s 
question: "Bow is society possible?" 
It would be idle to speculate what a sociological edition of the 
Critique of ~ Reason, miqht have looked like. The 2nd Edition was 
designed to fend off traditional epistemological criticism that the 
Ist Edition was psycholoqistic and insufficiently distinct from a 
Berkeleyian kind of idealism. To have introduced poorly developed 
socioloqical considerations at that staqe would have been to side-
track Kant from his purpose at hand. But not only that, if Kant had 
revisited the Ist Edition with a view to accommodating sociological 
considerations it seems to me that the Ist Critique would have 
unraveled. Consider: (a) by abandoning his natural science 
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standpoint the distinction between phenomena and noumena would have 
collapsed; (b) by introducing participant-observor knowledge the 
intelligible world would have become knowable; (c) super-sensible or 
"abstract" phenomena (ie, internal relations) would have been 
introduced; (d) by countenancing collective ideas and social facts, 
Kantian individual synthesis and the very idea of an asocial self 
would have required replacement with something far beyond what the 
Ist Critique could have sustained; and finally (e) the possibility 
of language and speech would have necessitated a sui generis (or 
collective) synthesis of symbolic interaction (what Hegel referred 
to as Vereinigung - "unity") . Kant did not introduce sociological 
considerations into the 2nd Edition of the Ist Critique, though we 
may suppose that he was not entirely ignorant of them. And he must 
have realized at some stage that any "sociological" edition was out 
of the question for architechtonic and logical reasons. Perhaps this 
helps explain why there is nothing sociological in the Ist Critique -
Kant thought it had to be that way. 
In criticizing the Critique of ~ Reason, and in developing his own 
idealism, Hegel did not attempt to trace Kant's sociological ideas, 
or to in any way read them back into the Ist Critique. Hegel went 
back to the ancients for his sociological inspiration. He was 
inspired by Plato's analysis of the city as a kind of society, and 
by Aristotle's developmental conception of society, with its 
transition from the family to the state. The first Western 
discoverers of society were, after all, Plato and Aristotle. 
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Un1ike Hege1, Kant was 1itt1e inf1uenced by Greek thought. He seems 
to have discovered society entire1y on his own. His thinking was 
inexorab1e and high1y architechtonic. At first it was profound1y 
asocio1ogica1. On1y 1ater did he turn his profound and origina1 mind 
to questions about the foundations of socia1 know1edge and the 
possibi1ity of society. And it was to Kant, rather than to the 
Greeks or to Hege1, that Simme1 and Durkheim turned fo.r their 
socio1ogica1 inspiration. But not in the way one might have thought. 
Not from a study of Kant's practica1 and anthropo1ogica1 ref1ections, 
but through an appreciation of the asocio1ogica1 Ist Critique, which 
they both attempted to socio1ogize in various ways. Simme1's essay 
"How is Society Possib1e?" was c1ear1y inspired by his reading of the 
Ist Critique, as were his conceptions of socia1 judgements and socia1 
forms. Durkheim's E1ementar_y Forms of Re1igious Life is an attempt 
to app1y Kantian Ist Critique ideas, admitted1y in a socio1ogized 
form, to prob1ems of the socio1ogy of know1edge. Simi1ar 
observations cou1d be made about Wi1he1m Di1they and Max Weber, and 
other "neo-Kantian" socia1 theorists who were deep1y inf1uenced by 
the Ist Critique. Di1they for examp1e aimed to (but never did) write 
a Critique ~ Historica1 Reason that wou1d have done for the socia1 
sciences what the Ist Critique had done for the natura1 sciences, and 
in particu1ar for Newton's physics, and Weber's dep1oyment of Kantian 
ideas in his construction of idea1 types is too we11-known to require 
comment. 
Due to i11 hea1th Kant gave up 1ecturing in 1799. He died on 12 
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February 1804. Within that short time he produced a collection of 
unpublished work, subsequently called his ~ Postum. This work is 
not well known. But it seems reasonable to suppose that some of it 
deals with his sociological ideas and provides clues as to how they 
may have developed. Kant was thinking about sociological problems 
from at least 1785 onwards. This means that for a period of nearly 
twenty years he was, at the very least, sensitive to these problems. 
We also have reason to believe that he was seriously working on these 
problems towards the end of his life, in particular in his 
anthropological writings. The philosophical work of Kant seems to 
be, in Collinqwood's apt words, "one of those things whose magnitude 
only seems to increase with every advance in our understanding of 
them." 
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